Courts, Covenants, and Communities
Clayton P. Gillettet

The dramatic rise of residential associations' gives reason to
believe that both the blessing and the curse of decentralization
can be realized more fully within these communities than
through more traditional local governments. Both consequences
follow from the fact that associations allow individuals with
common preferences to gravitate to a common location where
they can pursue their conception of the good life. The blessing of
this possibility is illustrated by Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Schad v Borough of Mount Ephraim.2 The majority in that case
invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, a zoning ordinance
that prohibited live entertainment and that was directed specifically at nude dancing. But to the Chief Justice, First Amendment
interests had no clear priority over the desires of residents within
a small community who wished to be "masters of their own environment."3 Hence, the borough's exercise of its zoning power "to
provide a setting of tranquility" was nothing more than a legiti-
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By the end of the [1980s], there were more than 130,000 [residential community
associations ("RCAs")] operating in the United States and more than 30 million
Americans were subject to RCA governance. The number of RCAs in the United
States is currently increasing by approximately 9,500 annually and is expected to
reach 225,000 by the year 2000. Assuming that the RCAs created in the next few
years are approximately the same size as those already in existence (approximately
230 residents per RCA), the number of Americans subject to RCA governance will
grow by approximately 2.1 million annually and will exceed 50 million by the year
2000.
Robert Jay Dilger, NeighborhoodPolitics: Residential Community Associations in American Governance 5 (NYU, 1992) (citations omitted). See also Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Residential Community Associations: Private Governments in
the Intergovernmental System? 1, 3-4 (1989) ("ACIR Report").
2 452 US 61, 85 (1981).
3 Id at 85.

1375

1376

The University of Chicago Law Review

[61:1375

mate attempt "to preserve the basic character of [the] community."4 Refusal to permit residents "to shape their community so
that it embodies their conception of the 'decent life'" would, in
Burger's view, destroy the diversity of local communities and
force all localities into "a mold cast by this Court."5 Perhaps it is
imputing too much to Burger's sympathetic view of small-town
life, but his appeals to mastery and to diversity seem to incorporate many of the more academic justifications of decentralization:
the creation of opportunities for self-government, the opportunity
to generate a mutually respectful heterogeneity within the larger
society,6 and-perhaps most relevant for current purposes-the
creation of an institution that the individual can identify more
closely with than an impersonal and distant centralized state.
The curse that confronts this idyllic view of small communities is evident in those critiques of localism that view the pursuit
of a common vision of the good life as inherently exclusionary.
Moreover, they contend, the bases of exclusion tend to reflect
selfishness, wealth, or ethnicity rather than a unique preference
for particular local public goods or an idiosyncratic, but benign,
lifestyle.7 While they do not necessarily ignore the possible
virtues of decentralization, these critiques of localism further
imply that achievement of those objectives requires satisfaction of
highly idealized assumptions about wealth, mobility, and the
external effects of local decisions that seem inconsistent with
contemporary urban experience.8 Since not all individuals can
live where they prefer, decentralization for the select few will
encourage them to seek isolation from the fiscal and physical
burdens of urban life instead of working for the improvement of
the larger community. Where communitarians imply that local-

Id at 85-86.
Id at 87.
6 See Jerry Frug, DecenteringDecentralization,60 U Chi L Rev 253 (1993). For criticism of Chief Justice Burger's view as centered on conceptions of the good that can only
be pursued by some segment of the population, see Robert Douglas Chesler, Imagery of
Community, Ideology of Authority: The Moral Reasoning of Chief Justice Burger, 18 Harv
CR-CL L Rev 457 (1983).
7 See Gary J. Miller, Cities by Contract: The Politics of MunicipalIncorporation 3741, 63 (MIT, 1981); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 Colum L Rev 1 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum L Rev 346 (1990); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,and the Indigent, 21 Stan L Rev 767
(1969).
" These assumptions are consistent with those made in the classic article by Charles
M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Pol Econ 416 (1956), which specifies the conditions for an ideal allocation of local public goods.
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ism can embody commitments to mutual respect among different
groups, the critiques respond with skepticism that the required
levels of toleration and altruism can be realized.'
Thus, we suffer, in the words of one commentator, from the
"instincts of inclusion and exclusion."' ° Because both the blessing of a participatory, communal system in which individuals can
pursue their goals and the curse of irresponsible isolation from
needy neighbors are entrenched in the way we think of our
society, we face substantial ambivalence about attempts to carve
out enclaves that depart from majoritarian norms. Our ambivalence toward communities is apparent in an inconsistent and
often disconnected series of constitutional law decisions that
sometimes allow, and sometimes prohibit, majority interference
with the practices and preferences of discrete ways of life."
In this Article, I argue that nonconstitutional doctrines also
reflect our ambivalence about decentralized communities. My
interests here lie in judicial review of the efforts of residential
associations, primarily homeowners associations, to define their
members' lifestyles in ways akin to the use of ordinances by
traditional local governments. Local governments assume identities by selecting a particular basket of goods and services at
particular tax prices, and then regulating the activity of those
who are attracted by the goods and services offered. Yet the size
of contemporary cities, combined with legal doctrines and political obstacles that prevent localities from differentiating among
residents for purposes of service provision, drives some individuals to seek more decentralized institutions to satisfy the search
for a specialized service package.

' See, for example, Amy Gutmann, CommunitarianCritics of Liberalism, 14 Phil &
Pub Aff 308, 318-320 (1985) ("[Clommunitarian critics want us to live in Salem, but not to
believe in witches."); Stephen Holmes, The PermanentStructure ofAntiliberal Thought, in
Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed, Liberalismand the Moral Life 227, 230-32 (Harvard, 1989).
"
Frug, 60 U Chi L Rev at 291 (cited in note 6).
n See, for example, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 113 S
Ct 2217 (1993) (invalidating, under the Free Exercise Clause, a city ordinance directed at
religious practice of ritual sacrifice of animals); Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972)
(exempting the Amish from a state law requiring high school attendance until the age of
sixteen); Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49 (1978) (allowing a Native American
tribe to determine its own membership even though the qualifications discriminate
against women); Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1 (1974) (upholding an ordinance
restricting land use to one-family dwellings); Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977)
(invalidating a one-family dwelling ordinance); State of Oregon v City of Rajneeshpuram,
598 F Supp 1208 (D Or 1984) (invalidating the incorporation of a city dedicated to a
religious purpose); Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432 (1985) (invalidating an
ordinance requiring group homes for the mentally retarded to obtain special use permits).
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The very fact that residential associations can fulfill the
goals that we identify with traditional local governments makes
us more skeptical of conferring on them the latitude that we
grant to other voluntary associations, such as the Boy Scouts, the
Rotary Club, the country club, or a law firm partnership. 2
There seems an initial incongruity about applying different
standards to review the same kind of directive (for example,
aesthetic regulation of architectural styles for residences), depending on whether the regulator is a private association or a
municipality.
But our desire to obtain the benefits of community-participation, connectedness to others-seems to demand
greater tolerance of associations that purport to serve a narrow,
self-defined constituency. The strength of the claim for tolerance
may depend on the extent to which we believe that those who
reside in small communities have significant interactions with
outsiders or are isolated from nonmembers. The communitarian
critique of the atomistic premises of liberalism relies in large
part on the theory that individuals form their preferences and
their identities through social interactions." Residential associations that are occupied by homogeneous populations (typically by
those best off within the society) and whose members eschew the

2

See, for example, Welsh v Boy Scouts of America, 993 F2d 1267 (7th Cir 1993), cert

denied, 114 S Ct 602 (1993) (holding that the Boy Scouts are not subject to a public
accommodation statute). This is not to say that we do not sometimes regulate these
associations. See, for example, Hishon v King & Spalding, 467 US 69 (1984) (requiring
the consideration of women for partnership in a law firm); Ruich v Ruff, Weidenaar &
Reidy, 837 F Supp 881 (N D Ill 1993) (holding a law firm partner subject to individual
liability under Title VII); New York State Club Ass'n v City of New York, 69 NY2d 211,
505 NE2d 915 (1987) (upholding an antidiscrimination law applied to "private" clubs);
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America v Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 204 Conn 287, 528 A2d 352 (1987) (holding the Boy Scouts subject to a public
accommodation statute); Rotary Internationalv Rotary Club ofDuarte, 481 US 537 (1987)
(upholding a statute requiring Rotary Clubs to admit women); United States v Lansdowne
Swim Club, 713 F Supp 785 (E D Pa 1989) (prohibiting discriminatory membership
policies by a swim club). Nor do I want to overstate the private nature of private associations, which may often be used to accomplish public purposes. See Hendrik Hartog, Public
Property and PrivatePower (Cornell, 1983) (noting the role of officials of New York City,
which was largely a private corporation in the eighteenth century, in the development of
modem municipal law and its accompanying justifications for local public action); Arthur
J. Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the
Common Law, 29 Buff L Rev 599 (1981).
13 See, for example, Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 11-13
(Cambridge, 1982); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 312-13 (Basic Books, 1983); Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community,
75 Cornell L Rev 1, 35-36 (1989); Frug, 60 U Chi L Rev at 260 (cited in note 6). For an
application to cities, see Gordon L. Clark, Judges and the Cities 27-32 (Chicago, 1985).
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company of outsiders may be considered the archetypal representatives of self-interested liberalism. But if residents of associations enjoy interactions with others at work, in social contexts, or
in politics (to name some alternatives), then the fact that they
seek a more private preserve for interactions with a more homogeneous population does14 not necessarily translate into a narrowly
self-interested lifestyle.
Residential associations, small enough to disaggregate
desirable from undesirable services and uniform enough to create
enclaves of social security, may satisfy both these objectives.
Indeed, I take it that part of the project for communitarians in
law is to nurture distinct communities while finding common
ground among seemingly exclusive groups, to "help undermine
the power of suburban consciousness by organizing interlocal
negotiations to highlight these contradictory instincts." 5 If that
is the case, then the combination of homogeneous residential
associations and interaction with diverse groups in other contexts
may actually serve the communitarian goal (although I suspect
that the residential association would constitute too thin of a
community to satisfy many communitarians).
Notwithstanding my implicit assumption that associations
attract similarly situated individuals, migration to a common
locality does not mean arrival at a frictionless society. Members
of homeowners associations may conflict with each other or, as a
group, with outsiders. Residents may find that their concept of
the good life is less consistent with that of their neighbors than
they had originally believed, or that it falls so far from
majoritarian norms as to provoke the active disapproval of nonresidents. Thus, disputes are likely to arise as residents of an
association implement their vision of their community or its
relationship to nonresidents. It is through resolution of these
disputes that the legal system reveals the value we ultimately
place on autonomous associations. The more that we value the
development of communities that have selected either a discrete
package of goods and services or that have opted for a more
privatized form of regulation than that offered by traditional
municipalities, the more the law should defer to associations as

"4 Of course, this might not be the case. A residential association that appeals to
retirees, for instance, may provide all the social, political, and economic activities that
residents require. See Frances FitzGerald, Cities On a Hill 203-45 (Simon and Schuster,
1986) (describing self-contained life in the retirement community of Sun City, Florida).
's Frug, 60 U Chi L Rev at 290-91 (cited in note 6).
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they seek to regulate their members. On the other hand, if we
consider either the objectives or the decision-making processes of
these institutions to be suspect, we presumably would limit our
deference.
I want to introduce one additional puzzle before examining
the legal responses to these issues. One of the salient characteristics of community life is the capacity to exclude along lines that
are selected by the community itself.16 The explicit bases of
exclusion with which I am concerned focus less on the discredited
efforts of associations to create islands of ethnic harmony than on
common ventures to attain the assumed pleasures of suburban
life, free from satellite dishes, trailer homes, tall fences, or
commercial vehicles. These criteria for exclusion do not necessarily carry the weighty social consequences of racial or religious
discrimination (unless we believe they are merely surrogates for
They are instead characteristic of the
prohibited classifications).
"ordinary vices" 7 of economically or socially exclusive organizations. Yet the negative reactions to homeowners associations
appear to be predicated on these forms of exclusion.
At the same time, both liberals and communitarians seem to
be tolerant of highly distinct subcultures. For the liberal who values individual choice, as for the communitarian who purports not
to select among visions of the good, it seems odd to afford substantial protection to communities furthest from the majority
culture s while affording little protection to those only marginally different from the majority. There seems something anomalous
about arguing for protection of groups such as orthodox Jews 9
or the Amish ° when their cultures conflict with majoritarian
norms while opposing similar license for those who seek residence in artificially pastoral settings free from technologies that
they deem unsightly or who live in such fear of crime that they
literally wall themselves off from the outside world.2 ' I am not
16 See, for example, Alexander, 75 Cornell L Rev at 52 (cited in note 13) ("Communi-

ties by their very nature exclude.").
"7 I take the phrase from Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Belknap, 1984), to
indicate that the bases for exclusion are neither heinous nor exceptional, but the result of
common-if objectionable-conduct.
'8 See Symposium: Preservationof Minority Cultures, 25 U Mich J L Ref 539 (1992).
19 See Board of Education v Grumet, 114 S Ct 2481 (1994) (creation of school district
along religious lines violates Establishment Clause); American Civil Liberties Union v
Long Branch, 670 F Supp 1293 (D NJ 1987) (construction of an "eruv" by religious Jews
on city property did. not violate Establishment Clause); Smith v Community Board No. 14,
491 NYS2d 584 (NY Sup Ct 1985) (same).
'0 See Yoder, 406 US 205.
21 See Government by the Nice, for the Nice, The Economist 25 (July 25, 1992); Ann
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certain what underlies this greater affection for the distant than
for the proximate. 2 Since many of the protected groups claim
religious or ethnic affiliations, some, but not all, of the explanation may lie in a general concern about discrimination based on
religion or ethnicity. I do not point out this puzzle because my
argument about associations demands that we accommodate
minor deviations from majoritarian norms as readily as we do
more divergent subcultures. Instead, I want only to point out
that there is nothing unique or obviously implausible to claims
that associations should enjoy a level of autonomy based only on
the desire of their members to achieve their common view of the

good life.
Part I of this Article explains some basic features of association structure and decision making. I also offer some explanations of why individuals may seek refuge in rule making by
associations rather than exclusively by traditional governments.
That discussion suggests various functions that associations
perform and the role of covenants in fulfilling those functions.
The variety of functions indicates that there is no monolithic
explanation for associations or the covenants that define them.
The role of covenants may vary from association to association
and from individual to individual within the same association.
The common theme that pervades all these institutions is that
associations (largely through the drafting and enforcement of
covenants) provide some value that traditional governments

Mariano, Enclosed Communities:Havens, or Worse?, Wash Post El (Apr 9, 1994).
' Mary Anne Case has suggested to me that this phenomenon may be analyzed in
terms of the Freudian notion of the "narcissism of minor differences." The smallness of
the differences may bring into stark relief the possibility of doing things in a different way
or may allow a group to cohere around the way in which it does things by criticizing those
who act differently. See Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A
Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 Va L Rev
1643, 1662-63 (1993).
In their contribution to this Special Issue, Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence
Sager implicitly offer a possible solution to this puzzle. Unpopular religious minorities, in
their view, are entitled to protection but not privilege. Those closest to the majoritarian
norm, however, would presumably not incur the wrath of unpopularity that is visited on
distant minorities. Thus, those who are closest to the majority do not require protection.
This explanation, while perhaps providing a grounding for constitutional doctrine concerning the relationship between religion and the state, does not provide a complete response
to my puzzle insofar as constitutional doctrine does not offer protection to all divergent
groups, but only to "religious" ones. Of course, divergent groups do not, by that feature
alone, induce calls for protection. We might believe that the American Nazi Party deserves less protection than the Young Republicans, although the former is further from
majoritarian norms than the latter.
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cannot, whether it be a good or service, an opportunity for private rulemaking, or assurances of stability.
In Part II, I then inquire into whether those objectives are
more likely to be satisfied if we allow associations to administer
regulations essentially free of judicial intervention, or if intervention is necessary in the same way that we allow courts to review
the decisions of localities. Finally, in Part III, I consider the
extent to which judicial intervention is necessary to restrict
association activities that affect nonresidents. This last inquiry
returns us to the point with which I began, the relationship
between communities and the larger society, and offers some
thoughts about the circumstances under which we should protect
community idiosyncracies, notwithstanding their adverse effects
on nonmembers.
I. THE PROMISE OF RESIDENTIAL ASSOCIATIONS
A. The Structure of Residential Associations
Residential associations range from condominium, cooperative, or homeowners associations with fewer than ten residents to
city-sized developments with tens of thousands of residents.'
While cooperative and condominium associations share most of
the features of homeowners associations that I discuss,' these
associations are most like local governments in that they encompass significant geographical areas rather than a single building
or series of buildings.' Like municipalities, associations frequently hold property in common for their resident members, and
either provide or contract out for the provision of services that
benefit members. Associations supply goods and services ranging
from the most common municipal functions, such as security
patrols and street maintenance, to more exotic but still common
municipal services, such as maintaining golf courses or community centers. Like municipalities, associations have the authority to
See ACIR Report at 3 (cited in note 1).
Condominium associations typically govern single buildings, whose residents own
their residences individually and their common areas (such as hallways and dividing
walls) in common. Cooperative associations own and maintain their buildings, while
residents own shares in the corporation and have a leasehold interest in their residence.
Homeowners associations typically consist of residents who own separate plats and
improvements within a development, while the association owns and manages common
property such as lakes, streets, and gateways. See, for example, Dilger, Neighborhood
Politics at 16-17 (cited in note 1).
' For the remainder of this Article, any reference to "association" means homeowners
association, unless the context indicates otherwise.
24
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impose exactions on residents (annual dues or assessments for
the maintenance of association property) and to enforce that
power by imposing liens on the property of nonpayors.2 6
This is not to suggest that all associations offer the same
services.2 7 Indeed, it is partly through the selection of public
goods and services that associations foster individual identities.
Just as municipalities may distinguish themselves by offering
superior schools, spacious parks, or proximity to workplaces, so
may associations offer singular services such as security gateways, a golf course, or a "'Caribbean Island' motif." '8 But also
like municipalities, which may pass ordinances affecting zoning,
condominium conversion, or other aspects of residents' welfare,
associations assume distinct identities through the regulation of
residents. It is through the enforcement of these regulations that
legal disputes about the scope of association autonomy are most
likely to arise.
Regulation by an association typically takes the form of conditions, covenants, and restrictions (which I will refer to collectively as "covenants") that constitute servitudes imposed on the
lots within the association's boundaries. The covenants are initially drafted by the developer of the area before individual units
are sold to the public.29 In addition, it is routine for voting control over amendment or enforcement of covenants to remain with
the developer until a certain number or percentage of units within the development are sold.30 At that point, the developer
transfers control to the association, or more specifically, to its
board of directors. The developer will also create the governance
structure of the association by drafting bylaws or articles of incorporation that allocate voting rights within the association and
that typically delegate interpretive and enforcement authority
over covenants to the board.3'
'2 See, for example, Westwood Homeowners Ass'n v Lane County, 118 Or App 310, 847
P2d 862, 865 (1993); Board of Directors of Olde Salem Homeowners' Ass'n v Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, 216 Il App 3d 281, 589 NE2d 761, 766 (1992); Inwood North
Homeowners'Ass'n v Harris,736 SW2d 632, 636-37 (Tex 1987).
'2 See Dilger, Neighborhood Politics at 20-23 (cited in note 1) (listing services commonly provided by associations).
'8 See Northern Palm Beach County Water Control District v Florida, 604 S2d 440,
444 (Fla 1992) (Shaw dissenting).
'2 See Dilger, Neighborhood Politics at 14 (cited in note 1); Urban Land Institute and
the Community Associations Institute, Creatinga Community Association: The Developer's
Role in Condominium and HomeownerAssociations (1977) (on file with the U Chi L Rev).
'0 For discussion of voting rights within associations, see Robert C. Ellickson, Cities
and Homeowners Associations, 130 U Pa L Rev 1519, 1543-44 (1982); Gerald E. Frug,
Cities and Homeowners Associations:A Reply, 130 U Pa L Rev 1589, 1592-96 (1982).
" See, for example, Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and "Reasonableness"in
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Regulatory covenants may be quite lengthy and detailed.
They typically purport to regulate such issues as architectural
design, 2 fencing,3 3 use of structures,3 4 use of common property,35 and subdivision of lots." They may restrict the activities
of residents far more than would be expected as a matter of common law or by local ordinance." Although they no longer control
the ethnicity of residents, 8 covenants may regulate at a
microlevel, so that they address such issues as the kinds of pets

Private Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 Ohio St L J 41, 47
(1990).
32 See, for example, Lookout Mountain ParadiseHills Homeowners'Ass'n v Viewpoint
Associates, 867 P2d 70 (Colo App 1993); Davis v Huey, 620 SW2d 561 (Tex 1981); Catalina
Square Improvement Committee v Metz, 630 SW2d 324 (Tex App 1982).
' See, for example, Black v Fox Hills North Community Ass'n, Inc., 90 Md App 75,
599 A2d 1228 (1992); Prestwick Landowners'Ass'n v Underhill, 69 Ohio App 2d 45, 429
NE2d 1191 (1980).
' See, for example, Mains FarmHomeowners Ass'n v Worthington, 121 Wash 2d 810,
854 P2d 1072 (1993) (restriction to single-family residence); Double D Manor, Inc. v
Evergreen Meadows Homeowners'Ass'n, 773 P2d 1046 (Colo 1989) (same).
' See, for example, MaJor v Miraverde Homeowners Ass'n, 7 Cal App 4th 618, 9 Cal
Rptr 2d 237 (1992) (enjoining enforcement of a rule limiting access to recreational areas
by nonresident owners).
36 In condominium association declarations, the association may retain the power to
approve the transfer of any interest in a unit. See, for example, Aquarian Foundation,
Inc. v Sholom House, Inc., 448 S2d 1166 (Fla App 1984).
"' See, for example, Murphy v Timber Trace Ass'n, 779 SW2d 603, 607-08 (Mo App
1989) (upholding sign restrictions in covenants although the same restrictions could not
have been imposed by a governmental entity); Ellickson, 130 U Pa L Rev at 1519, 1528
(cited in note 30). Compare City ofLadue v Gilleo, 114 S Ct 2038 (1994).
' Indeed, many covenants currently include express nondiscrimination clauses. See,
for example, Statement of Restrictions Covenants and Conditions for Ivy Farm, Albemarle
County, Virginia, which includes the following provision:
Any person, when he becomes an Owner, agrees that neither he nor any one authorized to act for him will refuse to sell or rent, after the making up [sic] of a bona fide
offer, or refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or to otherwise make unavailable
or deny any of the property owned by him in Ivy Farm to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
(on file with the U Chi L Rev).
In Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948), the Supreme Court determined that judicial
enforcement of a restrictive racial covenant would constitute state action for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts have been reluctant to extend that logic to other
areas. See, for example, Linn Valley Lakes Property Owners Ass'n v Brockway, 250 Kan
169, 824 P2d 948 (1992) (holding that enforcement of a restrictive covenant prohibiting
the placement of signs on private property is not state action prohibited by the First
Amendment); McGuire v Bell, 297 Ark 282, 761 SW2d 904, 911 (1988) (refusing to consider an equal protection argument against the enforcement of a restrictive covenant to prohibit the use of a residence for the mentally disabled). But see Park Redlands Covenant
Control Committee v Simon, 181 Cal App 3d 87, 226 Cal Rptr 199, 205-06 (1986) (finding
state action where city building permits had been conditioned on certain age and occupancy restrictions).
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that can be kept within the association, numbers of guests that
can be accommodated, the erection of a satellite dish,39 the size
of a mailbox,4" exterior colors,4 and types of vehicles maintained on the premises.42 In short, it is largely through the explication and enforcement of these covenants that the association
signals its vision of the good life to current and prospective homeowners.
Even for those within the association, covenants, which are
intended to bind current owners and their successors for decades,
necessarily contain ambiguities.43 The passage of time can only
exacerbate these ambiguities as technologies develop and social
norms change." The original purposes for restrictions on fencing, perhaps intended to ensure unimpaired vistas, may have
little application to electronically controlled "invisible" fencing
that keeps pets from wandering; limitations on uses to "singlefamily" residences may have uncertain application in an age
when group homes challenge traditional concepts of what it
means to be a "family." Efforts to resolve these ambiguities have
caused both courts and commentators difficulty in determining
how rigorously and by what standard to review the application of
association covenants.
One approach has been to incorporate rules drawn from
seemingly analogous areas. Most commonly, covenants are sub-

" See, for example, Miller v First Colony Community Services Ass'n, 1993 Tex App
LEXIS 2443.
" One covenant for Rosemont, a subdivision within Albemarle County, Virginia, provides:
Section 8.05. Mail Boxes. The [Architectural Control Board ("ACB")] shall provide
a description and/or sketch of what is permissible for mail boxes and/or paper delivery boxes. No mail or paper delivery boxes deviating from that so specified by the
ACB shall be erected without the prior written approval of the ACB as to location,
color, size, design, lettering and all other particulars of such mail or paper delivery
boxes, and the standards, brackets and name signs for such boxes.
(on file with U Chi L Rev).
"' See, for example, West Hill Colony, Inc. v Sauerwein, 138 NE2d 403 (Ohio App
1956).

42 See, for example, Cottrell v Miskove, 605 S2d 572 (Fla Dist App 1992); Forest Glen

Community Homeowners Ass'n v Nolan, 104 Ill App 3d 108, 432 NE2d 636 (1982).
" See Robert D. Brussack, Group Homes, Families, and Meaning in the Law of
Subdivision Covenants, 16 Ga L Rev 33, 34-40 (1981).
" The passage of time may also lead to a problem of obsolescence for some covenants.
See Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining ContingentRights: The Puzzle of "Obsolete" Covenants,
91 Colum L Rev 546 (1991). My concern here is more with ambiguity than with obsolescence, although to the degree that courts would ultimately determine whether a covenant
has become obsolete, the same analysis about the proper scope of judicial intervention
would apply.
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sumed within the law of servitudes, even though covenants governing many associational concerns will have difficulty satisfying
the technical requirements of servitude law, such as the prerequisite to enforcement that the servitude "touch and concern" the
land.45 Incorporating these covenants within traditional servitude law loads the dice against the party seeking enforcement of
the covenant; property law has a long history of disfavoring restraints on alienation.4 6 The legal doctrine that has evolved from
this disfavor insists on strict construction against limitations on
the contested use.47 In myriad rulings on association covenants,
courts explicitly invoke the rule of strict construction with reference to little other than historical disapproval."
Other courts, and several commentators, rely on the contractual nature of association membership to justify a different approach.4 9 They purport to invoke the intent of the parties,"0 or
the volitional nature of the undertaking,5 ' in spite of evidence
that association residents tend to be ignorant of the covenants by
which they are governed.5 2 Hence, much of the debate about the
5 See Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v Tydings, 864 P2d 392, 395 (Wash App
1993); Lookout Mountain ParadiseHills Homeowners' Ass'n v Viewpoint Associates, 867
P2d 70, 74 (Colo App 1993); Natelson, 51 Ohio St L J at 50-51 (cited in note 31); Uriel
Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J Legal Stud 139 (1978).
See James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward
Optimizing Economic Utility,Individual Liberty, and PersonalIdentity, 1989 Wis L Rev 1,
7-16. Winokur suggests that courts took a still less charitable view of servitudes before
the nineteenth century, when economic development suggested a need for controls on
private land use.
"' See Ritchie v Carriage Oaks Homeowners Ass'n, 592 S2d 361 (Fla Dist App 1992);
Woodcreek Ass'n v Bingle, 73 Ohio App 3d 506, 597 NE2d 1153, 1156 (1991); Barber v
Dixon, 302 SE2d 915, 916-17 (NC App 1983); Wisneiwski v Starr,393 S2d 488, 489 (Ala
1980); Wayne S. Hyatt, The Community Association:An Introduction, C500 ALI-ABA 363,
366 (1990).
" See, for example, Lathan v Hanover Woods Homeowners Ass'n, 547 S2d 319 (Fla
App 1989); Lake St. Louis Community Ass'n v Leidy, 672 SW2d 381 (Mo App 1984).
"' See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contractin the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S Cal L Rev 1353, 1353 (1982); Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U Chi L Rev 253, 279-83 (1976); Reichman, 7 J
Legal Stud at 154; Ellickson, 130 U Pa L Rev at 1526-30 (cited in note 30).
' See Arizona Biltmore Estates Ass'n v Tezak, 868 P2d 1030 (Ariz App 1993);
Norwood-NorlandHomeowners'Ass'n v Dade County, 511 S2d 1009, 1014 (Fla App 1987);
Gigowski v Russell, 718 SW2d 16, 18 (Tex App 1986).
"1 See, for example, West Hill Colony, Inc. v Sauerwein, 138 NE2d 403, 405 (Ohio App
1956).
52 See Dilger, NeighborhoodPolitics at 35 (cited in note 1); Winokur, 1989 Wis L Rev
at 59-60 (cited in note 46). It is difficult to know what to make of the question of purchaser ignorance, both as a descriptive and a normative matter. Several states have recently
required disclosure of association covenants to prospective purchasers, so that knowledge
may increase with time. See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 718.503 (West 1988 & Supp
1994); Mont Code Ann § 70-23-613 (1993); Va Code § 55-511 (Supp 1993); Wis Stat Ann §
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enforcement of covenants simply reflects broader debates about
the scope and meaning of freedom of contract. Landlord-tenant
law," local government law,54 and the law of private corporations55 have also been impressed into service to explain the
scope of association decision making and the proper scope of
judicial review. In addition, regardless of the specific analogy
used, courts frequently examine the "reasonableness" of the restriction and its application. 5 Commentators have found this
reasonableness test to be more stringent than the test that courts
apply to the regulations imposed by the entities to which associations are compared."
While these analogies provide some context by which to measure the role and autonomy of associations, none of them reaches
the issue most relevant to judicial intervention into associations'

703.33 (West 1981 & Supp 1993). Natelson attributes an increase in condominium-owner
knowledge to the existence of such statutes and to possible causes of action for rescission
where disclosure was not made. Natelson, 51 Ohio St L J at 62 (cited in note 31).
The question of how much information a purchaser must have before he or she has
"consented" to the terms of the purchase is much debated in the literature. I believe thatthis question, like the question of consent in any other purchase, is best answered by
asking whether we believe that one of the parties is systematically disadvantaged in a
manner that mandates intervention by a third party (typically a court) to undo the
transaction. Traditionally, this would require more than mere ignorance; it would require
that the party claiming disadvantage did ngt have the knowledge, and could not reasonably have obtained an opportunity to secure it.
' See Frances T. v Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal 3d 490, 723 P2d 573, 576
(1986).
" See Cohen v Kite Hill Community Ass'n, 142 Cal App 3d 642, 191 Cal Rptr 209,
214 (1983); Katharine Rosenberry, Condominium and Homeowner Associations: Should
They be Treated Like "Mini-Governments?",in ACIR Report at 69 (cited in note 1).
See Vernon Bowdish Builder,Inc. v Spalding Lake Homeowners'Assn, 196 Ga App
370, 396 SE2d 24 (1990); Beehan v Lido Isle Community Ass'n, 70 Cal App 3d 858, 137
Cal Rptr 528, 531-32 (1977); Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Community Association Use Restrictions:
Applying the Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 Chi Kent L Rev 653, 664-69 (1988).
" See, for example, Annis v Turtle Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 1992 Neb App LEXIS,
*9; Holiday Pines Property Owners Ass'n v Wetherington, 596 S2d 84, 87 (Fla App 1992);
Oakbrook Civic Ass'n v Sonnier,481 S2d 1008 (La 1986). The "reasonableness" standard is
often embodied in statute. See Cal Civil Code § 1354(a) (West Supp 1994) ("The covenants
and restrictions in the declaration shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable .... ."); Note, JudicialReview of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 Harv L Rev 647,
652 n 29 (1981). Some courts, however, specifically eschew investigation into the reasonableness of a regulation. In Hidden HarbourEstates, Inc. v Basso, 393 S2d 637, 640 (Fla
App 1981), the court declared that use restrictions in a declaration of a condominium may
have "a certain degree of unreasonableness" but still be judicially upheld. Professor
Ellickson asserts that reasonableness review is appropriate with respect to amendments
to covenants, though not with respect to the original covenants. See Ellickson, 130 U Pa L
Rev at 1526 (cited in note 30).
"T See Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, Property 935 (Little, Brown, 3d ed
1993).

1388

The University of Chicago Law Review

[61:1375

affairs: the core question of institutional competence. The level of
associations' autonomy to govern the relationships among their
members or between members and nonmembers should depend
on the threshold questions of what roles associations play and
the extent to which, left to their own devices, covenants will
fulfill those roles. It is to these threshold questions that I next
turn.
B. Models of Residential Associations
1. The public goods model.
a) Associations as providers. For those who consider a
primary value of local governments to be their capacity to provide
local public goods efficiently, the ability of residential associations
to achieve that same objective underlies much of their appeal.
Local public goods are susceptible to misallocation for a variety of
reasons. Most obviously, a locality's boundaries may not coincide
with the ideal service area for a good or service that the locality
provides. This follows from the fact that local public goods tend
to be impure. Over some range, they exhibit the nonrivalness and
nonexcludability characteristics of public goods. Were that not
the case, there would be little reason to rely on collective provision, rather than market mechanisms, to make the good available at all. The range over which a good displays these characteristics, however, may be larger or smaller than the locality as a
whole. Because localities provide an array of goods and services,
it is unlikely that any one of them will fit perfectly within municipal boundaries. Ideal areas for police services, for instance, may
have little to do with the ideal areas for water service or schools.
This lack of fit may lead a state or its localities to offer a
particular service through a more centralized entity, a fact that
explains the attractiveness of special districts or metropolitan
organizations." But the lack of coincidence between municipal
boundaries and ideal service areas may also compel further decentralization, since local governments may otherwise be unable
either to measure accurately the demand for the service within
the locality or to provide the service to those who value it most
highly. A primary source of this inability is the divergent
preferences of municipal residents. In the absence of highly styl-

' See, for example, Comment, An Analysis of Authorities: Traditional and
Multicounty, 71 Mich L Rev 1376, 1426-27 (1973); Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Metropolitan Organization:The Allegheny County Case 86-88 (1992).
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ized assumptions concerning mobility, numbers of localities, and
consumer information, all residents of a locality will not share
the same tastes for all municipal services." The result may be
that residents within the locality have very different views about
what local public goods and services should be provided, and in
what amounts.
Provision in accordance with the community's median preferences may be frustrated by the ability of discrete majorities or
privileged minorities to form and impose their own tastes on
others who neither desire the good nor can take advantage of it,
but who also cannot effectively lobby against its public provision
or escape payment for it. Escape will be frustrated where the
price of the good is bundled-through taxes-with the price of
desired goods. Those who favor a municipally financed golf
course, for instance, may successfully lobby for its creation, even
though (1) the spillover benefits to nonusers are minimal, (2)
nonusers represent a substantial segment of the population, and
(3) those who favor the golf course would be unwilling to incur
the entire cost themselves if they could not impose some of the
cost on other residents. If a measure to construct the golf course
passes, those who oppose it and who do not benefit from it will be
unable to avoid subsidizing the project if financing is procured
through property taxes that all residents must pay. As a result,
localities will tend to overspend on goods that are not desired by
all constituents and that are only impurely "public" throughout
the locality."
A discrete group that prefers a good not desired (or more of a
good than is desired) by others within the community, however,
will be successful in obtaining it only if the group can secure the
support of the local decision-making body. Legal doctrine as well
as political concerns usually mean that the group faces an uphill
battle. Localities are bound by legal obligations of equal service61 and "public purpose" spending6 2 that are imposed to pre" See Tiebout, 64 J Pol Econ at 426 (cited in note 8). In creating his model for an
ideal allocation of public services, Tiebout assumed that under certain conditions, including perfect mobility, information, the absence of externalities, and choice among substantial numbers of localities, individuals with similar preferences would migrate to the same
locality, so that those within a given locality would share the same preferences. Where
those assumptions fail, however, individuals with different preferences will share the
same locality.
' See, for example, James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 135-45 (Michigan, 1962) (road paving problem); Henry J. Raimondo, Economics of
State and Local Government 77-79 (Praeger, 1992).
Veach v Phoenix, 102 Ariz 195, 427 P2d 335, 337 (1967).
The public purpose doctrine requires that municipal expenditures benefit the entire
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vent invidious discrimination within the municipality or to preclude discrete groups from lobbying successfully for unique benefits.' As one result of these doctrines, even where the effects of
public provision coincide with local boundaries, localities cannot
readily respond to differential demand by residents. Residents
within the locality who would prefer to trade one service for another are unable to do so. For example, a locality that provides
more police services to one neighborhood than another will likely
face claims of unequal service provision and will have difficulty
claiming that it has compensated for the disparity by providing
more of a different service in the area underserved by police.
Even a group that desires unique services and that can overcome
these doctrinal difficulties in securing its agenda will face obstacles because traditional free-riding problems induce rational
residents to eschew participation in the effort to secure desired
services. Those who prefer the service may be difficult to identify
or to monitor, especially where they are spread throughout the
locality.
Thus, residents who desire a service not preferred by a majority within the locality may be better off if they can bind themselves to pay for the service through private funds. Associations
provide just such an opportunity for those with similar preferences to gravitate to a common area and bind each other to make
payments for the goods that they find most attractive, but that
cannot be easily obtained through political processes. It is important to note, since I will return to this theme, that those joining
the association thereby evince a desire for private ordering rather
than for politics. At the same time, provision of the service by the
association may bo socially desirable, since it reduces the incentives of the group to seek subsidies through the public treasury
for goods and services that the majority would prefer not to provide. In these circumstances, the further decentralization of provision requires those who idiosyncratically prefer a different good
or more of a good than the majority to pay something closer to its
full cost. Individuals who, for instance, desire more police services than the average resident of the municipality may find it
easier to coalesce in a section of the municipality and hire private

locality rather than one segment of it. See Anderson v Baehr, 217 SE2d 43, 47 (SC 1975);
Robert S. Amdursky and Clayton P. Gillette, MunicipalDebt FinanceLaw §§ 3.1, 3.5 (Littie, Brown, 1992).
' See Ammons v Dade City, 783 F2d 982 (11th Cir 1986); Dowdell v City of Apopka,
698 F2d 1181 (11th Cir 1983).
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security forces rather than to lobby for more police services citywide.' The result of all these phenomena is that residential
associations hold out the promise that services can be more directly linked to the tastes of particular residents. By matching
more precisely the supply and demand of public goods, associations play much the same role that municipalities seek to accomplish by privatizing local services or by shifting to user fee
schemes to pay for publicly provided services.65
Associations may also solve the allocational problems that
can arise even if a local public good has a benefit range consistent with municipal boundaries. A public good may be subject to
congestion if the entire public is able to use it. Again, the golf
course serves as an example. Within a segment of the locality,
the demand for the golf course may be sufficiently small that it
takes on the nonrival features of a public good; once open to the
entire locality, however, congestion and the concomitant need for
size restrictions become apparent.66 Providing the good to members of a restrictive "club" creates a pattern of provision consistent with actual preferences; those who pay for the golf course
will be able to enjoy its full use, not a use limited and devalued
by congestion.
Once more, associations allow those who share preferences to
create a system that restricts access and thereby makes an asset
more useful. At the same time, the binding nature of the
association's covenants that obligate members to pay for the
asset overcomes holdout problems and transaction costs that
would likely frustrate efforts to restrict access through a series of
explicit contracts. While we might be justifiably concerned
with some grounds for restriction, for the moment I am concerned only with establishing the principle that restrictions on
access by a club are not inherently suspect, and may be essential
to ensure optimal use of a resource.
This optimistic story about the allocational benefits of decentralization, however, may be offset by distributional effects of

'

See Ronald J. Oakerson, Private Street Associations in St. Louis County: Subdivi-

sions as Service Providers, in ACIR Report at 55, 57-59 (cited in note 1).
For a discussion of the ways in which user fees may coordinate the provision of
6
public services and the willingness to pay for them, see Clayton P. Gillette and Thomas D.
Hopkins, Federal User Fees:A Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 BU L Rev 795 (1987).
" See Todd Sandler and John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An
Evaluative Survey, 18 J Econ Lit 1481, 1482 (1980).
6
For defense of covenants based on avoidance of holdout problems, see Richard A.
Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 Cornell L Rev 906, 921-22 (1988).
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allowing residents to pick and choose municipal services. The
pessimistic story is that municipal residents who can afford to do
so will isolate themselves in associations where they can contract
privately for desired services and oppose additional municipal
funding of the same services for outsiders. For instance, those
who seek above-average levels of security and can afford to do so
will take refuge in privately patrolled enclaves and then oppose
significant funding of municipal police services in order to minimize their total of tax payments and private payments. To the
extent that private deterrents do not reduce crime, but only redirect it, allowing private funding of police services not only invites
underfunding for outsiders, but also imposes disproportionate
amounts of crime on those who are not association members.
Although the pessimistic story may accurately describe some
consequences of association autonomy, the issue of who is imposing undesirable activities on whom is more complicated. Even
assuming that we wish to address questions of redistribution at a
decentralized level,6" some checks exist on the willingness or
ability of association members to reduce benefits to others. Residents who provide their own services might still wish to maintain
property values throughout the locality in order to support their
own values, and hence support a high level of services
throughout the locality. Think, for instance, of whether those who
send their children to private school would necessarily oppose increases in public school funding. The desire to maintain resale
values of their homes might lead even those who do not directly
use public schools to contribute to quality education in the community. Further, those within the association are likely to view
the question of external effects in a different light. Association
members are likely, for instance, to consider crimes committed
within the association by nonmembers as externalities imposed
by the rest of the community on them. There seems little basis
for an ethical claim that they should be disabled from taking
protective measures that reduce these externalities, whether
those measures entail the purchase of expensive locks, neighborly
agreements to watch each other's homes, contractual agreements
between a homeowner and a private security firm, or contractual

' There is a substantial literature that suggests that redistributional issues are not
well addressed at the local level, because of opportunities for exit by those who are best
off and not altruistic. See, for example, Helen F. Ladd and Fred C. Doolittle, Which Level
of Government Should Assist the Poor?, 35 Natl Tax J 323 (1982); Ellickson, 130 U Pa L
Rev at 1554-56 (cited in note 30).
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agreements by an association on behalf of numerous homeowners
and the same security firm. Indeed, given the signalling role that
we often attribute to individual choices, it seems odd to suggest
that we might prohibit those dissatisfied with municipal services
from obtaining a different level of services from another provider.
Just as customer exit from a firm's product indicates a competitive failure, if substantial numbers of residents opt out of a municipal service, we typically think we have received important
evidence that local officials have misunderstood the preferences
of residents.69 It would be difficult to bar residents from acting
on their distinct preferences for a particular level of service without simultaneously hindering residents' ability to signal their dissatisfaction to their officials.
Finally, private provision of services may actually have a
positive distributional effect on nonmembers. Members who make
payments to associations for services that would otherwise be
provided in whole or in part by the locality are typically not permitted to offset those payments against local taxes. The locality,
therefore, can either reduce tax payments for all residents or
expend additional funds for locality-wide services.° In either
case, payments for private services that reduce the need for municipal services within the association increase the ability of the
locality to address the needs of nonmember residents.
The distributional effects of associations and the justifications for them, therefore, are more ambiguous than might be
thought from simplistic initial reactions that view these entities
either as mechanisms of escape for the privileged or as social
benefactors that limit wasteful cross-subsidies. I will return to
the distributional issue both in discussing the role of covenants
and, in the last part of this Article, in analyzing when the external effects of covenants may be so significant as to warrant judicial intervention. For the moment, I conclude only that facile
responses to the issue are unsuitable.

See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 16-17 (Harvard, 1970).
o See, for example, ACIR Report at 18 (cited in note 1). The positive redistributional
effects would disappear if residents of associations received some rebate on their tax payments for the costs of privately provided services; although, as the text indicates, this is
not the typical situation. New Jersey requires municipalities either to provide certain
services to a "qualified private community," such as a homeowners association, or to
reimburse a "qualified private community" that provides its own services. Services covered
by the requirement include street maintenance, street lighting, and refuse collection. See
NJ Rev Stat §§ 40:67-23.2 to 23.8 (1993).
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b) Covenants as proxy and as common plan. Even if we
accept that associations can play a substantial role in matching
service preferences and payments, it is not obvious that association covenants are necessary to accomplish that objective. Covenants other than those relating to payment obligations"' rarely
address issues of service, and the legal disputes that construe
association covenants are seldom directly related to service provision. Instead, the cases, at least those that are reported at the
appellate level, tend to be concerned with maintaining prohibited
structures or land uses or acting in a manner that offends the
aesthetic tastes of other members." Hence, one might conclude
that the goal of providing an optimal level of public goods within
the association has few implications for the interpretation of the
association's covenants.
On reflection, however, the relationship between covenants
and services may be more substantial. As noted above, the goods
that associations provide tend to be impure public goods beyond a
limited geographical range. At some point, congestion will threaten the ability to take advantage of roads, lakes, golf courses, or
other common areas typically administered by localities or associations.7 3 Hence, some sorting mechanism is necessary to separate those who are and are not entitled to the good. Explicit pricing, first come/first served, or auctions may all be used for such
separation; association covenants provide an alternative: selection on the basis of homogeneity.74 While we do not necessarily
value homogeneity where it is based on invidious forms of discrimination, association covenants (at least those that courts will
be willing to enforce)7 5 typically discriminate on more mundane
characteristics of lifestyle. Covenants that indicate socially acceptable, if not universally commended, lifestyles permit individuals who seek to live among those with similar tastes7" a rela" See, for example, Regency Homes Ass'n v Egermayer, 243 Neb 286, 498 NW2d 783
(1993) (foreclosure of lien for failure to pay dues to maintain recreational facilities); Lake
Arrowhead Community Club, Inc. v Looney, 112 Wash 2d 288, 770 P2d 1046 (1989)
(enforcement of covenant to pay assessments for neighborhood facilities); Inwood North
Homeowners' Ass'n v Harris, 736 SW2d 632 (Tex 1987) (enforcement of covenant to pay
assessments for repair of common areas); Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 1988 Duke L J 925, 961-64.
72 See cases cited in notes 32-42.
7 See Todd Sandler, Collective Action 63-65 (Michigan, 1992).
7 See Sandler and Tschirhart, 18 J Econ Lit at 1482 (cited in note 66).
"
Covenants that violate constitutional or statutory provisions will not be enforced.
See Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948); Taormina Theosophical Community, Inc. v Silver,
140 Cal App 3d 964, 190 Cal Rptr 38 (1983).
"' On the frequency and propriety of such motivations, see Thomas C. Schelling,
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tively costless means of identifying each other. At the same time,
covenants allow individuals to define characteristics of the favored lifestyle. As indicated above, lifestyle choices may be reflected in a desire for differential levels of service, such as security; but lifestyles may also be reflected in an aversion to certain
activities or land uses to which a segment of the population is
uniquely averse. The legal effects that we give to covenants,
effectively making them operative in perpetuity, provide the added assurance that homogeneity of preferences will remain. The
same stability cannot be attributed to zoning ordinances, which
are susceptible to political shifts.
In this way, covenants solve a coordination problem. Individuals who seek a specific package of services may (or may not)
also care about the other characteristics of those with whom they
share club goods. For those who are indifferent, traditional neighborhoods or associations with few covenants unrelated to service
will be appropriate. For others, however, service packages and
homogeneity are inherently related. For these groups, covenants
provide a salient signal, reducing both the search costs involved
in finding like-minded individuals and the risk of regret that
would be suffered should one discover, after making an expensive
home purchase, that the neighborhood is less hospitable than
originally assumed.7 7 For those to whom service packages are
secondary to concerns about the externalities imposed by living
within the immediate range of particular activities or structures,
and who desire more control than can be afforded by zoning or
market mechanisms alone, covenants provide both a private
means of rulemaking that reflects those desires and a stabilizing
precommitment device against changing preferences.
My claim, then, is that covenants may play multiple roles in
the allocation of local public goods. They permit individuals
whose preferences to encourage or discourage discrete activities
are sufficiently common to serve as a coordination point, but not
so robust as to warrant supervision by a governmental body, to
enact regulations that supplement those of the state. For those
who consider any competing lifestyle to be an externality imposed
on them, covenants produce a tranquil homogeneity. And for
those who seek security in the status quo, covenants also provide

Micromotives and Macrobehavior 137-90 (Norton, 1978); Thomas C. Schelling, Models of
Segregation, 59 Am Econ Rev 488 (1969).
"' See Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms 104-09 (Oxford, 1977).
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a mechanism that binds both themselves and others against
radical change in those desires.
But covenants do not simply regulate the specific activity
they address. The preferences that motivate individuals to migrate to a particular location or association may not be readily
susceptible to precise description. Covenants may serve as rough,
but appropriate, surrogates, providing signals of sufficient salience to allow coordination among individuals with vague, but
similar, lifestyle preferences. In this sense, covenants are indicators of a way of life, rather than simply restrictions on specific
land uses.
For instance, even where individuals do not have an aversion
to certain practices that are prohibited in covenants, such as
maintenance of trailer homes, they may believe that there is a
correlation between the subject of the covenant and characteristics that can serve as the basis for a desirable affinity. I may
have nothing against trailer homes, other things being equal.
That is, I may believe that they are not aesthetically displeasing,
and may believe that they offer the best available housing opportunities for a large segment of the population. I may, however,
simultaneously seek a relatively noise-free environment, or assurances that I live among others who do not mind a high degree
of regimentation, and hence are less likely to be offended when I
complain of what to me is excessive noise. A covenant against
"unreasonable noise" may be too imprecise to accomplish my
objectives. I therefore may prefer a more certain surrogate that
reflects the level of comfort to which I aspire. If I believe that the
presence of trailers is positively correlated with bothersome levels of noise, a covenant against trailer homes may serve this
proxy role. Similarly, while few might object to a general standard that neighbors not engage in activities that are "unsightly"
or that "diminish property values," the difficulty of agreeing, ex
post, on what activities satisfy these criteria might warrant, ex
ante, precise restrictions that reduce subsequent costs of deciding
whether the community standard has been violated.
More than serving as proxies for less describable characteristics, however, covenants that bar specific activities describe a
common plan. A set of covenants taken together may be attractive to some and repugnant to others. For some, the set of covenants may indicate order, belonging, and security. For others, the
same set may signal regimentation, exclusion, and elitism. But
the very fact that the set of covenants, taken as a whole, can
send either signal suggests that covenants have the capacity to
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form a basis of association for those who share a view of the good
life. In this sense, homogeneity serves as an appropriate
discriminant for ascertaining who is entitled to a club good. As
common plans, more than as specific governance structures, covenants form private constitutions;7 8 thus, the judicial role in construing covenants should be debated in light of their implicit
constitutive benefits, not merely their formal provisions.
While I believe that these characteristics accurately capture
the utility of covenants, I admit to some discomfort about allowing too much to turn on them. Some proxies will either be irrational or will be used too readily as surrogates for discrimination on
bases more invidious than I want to endorse. Those who live in
trailer homes, for instance, may in fact be no more prone to noisy
behavior than others, notwithstanding my irrational view. Alternatively, the ban on trailer homes may serve more as a surrogate
for wealth than for noise; it is less clear that we would embrace
an explicit exclusion on that basis, even if constitutionally permissible. 9
Nevertheless, neither irrationality nor prejudice (short of the
type that triggers constitutional concerns) necessarily means
associations should be condemned or receive greater judicial
scrutiny than would otherwise apply. Covenants that are based
on irrationality should become obsolete or be repealed without
external intervention, since their enforcement would reduce market values for the rational majority of prospective homeowners.
In addition, the "rationality" of some reactions, for example,
whether satellite dishes are aesthetically displeasing, may be
quite subjective. In such cases, there is little reason to convert
courts into arbiters of collective rationality.
Covenants that exclude on the basis of common prejudice are
more problematic. Recall that part of our ambivalence about
decentralization has to do with the tendencies of communities to
isolate themselves, to cut themselves off from the problems of the
larger society rather than to embrace some idiosyncratic view of
the good life. If our reaction to associations is predicated on their
tendencies for residential isolation, however, then placing constraints uniquely on these entities seems inappropriate. Isolation
or sorting may take many forms other than the creation of homogeneous associations. Established neighborhoods and even com' See Epstein, 73 Cornell L Rev at 906-07 (cited in note 67).
71 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v Rodriquez, 411 US 1 (1973) (holding
that wealth is not an inherently suspect classification).
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plete towns or cities (certainly suburbs) tend to sort by income or
socioeconomic status, even without covenants. Sorting may be
assisted by zoning regulations that restrict or invite certain types
of housing or individuals with certain incomes. Indeed, some
neighborhoods invite sorting into diverse groups by offering a mix
of housing alternatives within a relatively small geographical
area. Thus, even if we rejected or narrowly construed covenants
that had these tendencies, we would not eliminate the sorting
that may be attributed to homogeneous associations. One may
object, however, that even if we permit this kind of sorting, we
need not facilitate the practice by embracing covenants that allow relatively costless patterns of homogeneity. Indeed, the high
costs associated with sorting by incorporating a municipality or
enacting zoning regulations to codify isolationist preferences
might be considered a means by which we ensure that those who
sort themselves do so only after considering (and internalizing)
some of the social burdens associated with their preferences.
This reaction, however, seems questionable on a number of
grounds. Most obviously, sorting that occurs within neighborhoods of a municipality requires fewer, not greater, costs than
the formation of an association, although the permanency of
covenants means that neighborhoods may be less stable than
associations. In addition, if we believe there is something untoward about sorting on these characteristics, then it seems odd to
allow them to be embodied by a governmental entity, such as an
incorporated municipality, but not by private individuals.
More to the point, however, the attack on homogeneous sorting denies the very condition that seems to underlie the desire
for community. If we attribute any positive significance to distinct communities, we are hard pressed to forbid all exclusions
that maintain the social cohesion that defines the community."0
As Gregory Alexander has written:

' Professor Frug argues: "Those who want to move to a neighborhood should not face
community-imposed obstacles to doing so (the community should have no right to exclude
them). But the ability to maintain a relatively homogeneous community should also not be
forbidden (there should be no right to be included)." Frug, 60 U Chi L Rev at 291 (cited in
note 6). Frug suggests that he can reconcile these two views by forbidding a community to
prohibit "outsiders" from moving in, but refusing to force anyone within the community to
sell to an outsider. Id at 291 n 182. I am more skeptical of this attempt at reconciliation.
If the community defines itself by reference to exclusion, then it is unclear why the community cannot enforce its view against its members, especially those (sellers) who are
about to move out and thus will not internalize the consequences their sale to an outsider
has on the community that remains.

1994]

Courts, Covenants, and Communities

1399

Precisely because [communities] are constituted by shared
commitments to some specific good they must, in symbolic
effect if not in conscious intention, exclude some members of
the society, precluding those individuals from participating
in the group's internal life.81
Thus, the fact that some people select residence on the basis of
homogeneity while others select on the basis of diversity seems to
strengthen rather than threaten the objectives pursued in
community's name.
Finally, the concern for the use of covenants as proxies for
discrimination on the basis of wealth may make sense against a
background in which most associations are seen as weapons of
the wealthy. But there are reasons to believe that the same tools
may be used by those less advantaged. Recent press accounts
indicate that residents of low-income housing units have attempted to bar certain undesirable activities, and those efforts would
presumably be simplified if they could be embodied in covenants
that bound all tenants." Given that the distributional issues
surrounding covenants are, at best, complicated, courts do not
necessarily have any advantage over political processes or housing markets in identifying situations where the community's exclusion becomes inappropriate. And judicial competence is least
plausible where a covenant's exclusions rely on bases that do not
offend constitutional protections. In Section III, I return to this
question in order to identify situations in which courts might
refuse to enforce covenants that have substantial effects on nonresidents.
c) Associations as enforcers of covenants. Even where
covenants among private actors capture the benefits of homogeneity, stability, and more appropriate levels of service, homeowners associations might still be superfluous. The covenant, not the
governing body, gives expression to a common perspective of the
good life. The terms of the covenant make violations of this perspective apparent to, and enforceable by, individual residents. Individual enforcement of covenants, however, is costly both in
terms of the effort (including financial effort) that must be expended to remedy an alleged violation, and in terms of the injury

8 Alexander, 75 Cornell L Rev at 52 (cited in note 13).
See, for example, Jan Crawford, Lane Says He Could Back Voluntary CHA
Searches, Chi Trib B1 (Apr 20, 1994).
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to neighborly relations that one must risk by "snitching" on the
defector. For any one resident, each of these costs can be avoided
if some other resident undertakes the enforcement action. The
expected result is that individual residents, even those who object to a violation, will underenforce the community's norm.
There will be cases in which some residents suffer greater
harms from a violation than others, and hence have greater enforcement incentives. For instance, the neighbor whose view is
directly impaired by the offending fence or color scheme may be
more likely to seek redress than the down-the-street resident
who primarily fears the inroads that the offense makes on general neighborhood conformity. But because these more noxious
harms are likely to result from physical proximity to the violator,
the offended neighbor is also more likely to value sociable relations with the violator, and may forgo enforcement to preserve
them. Conversely, where violators are distant from those offended, and neighborly relations are thus less important, the noxious
activity is likely to have subtler or more diffuse effects, so that
any offended neighbor will again have little incentive to enforce.
The same problem hampers the enforcement of community
norms against the outside world. Members of a community will
typically believe that they should be able to enforce their norms,
even where those norms conflict with those of the larger locality.
They may, for instance, claim that zoning regulations do not
apply within the association's boundaries, or that restrictions
that apply to local governments do not apply to private communities.' Yet because all members would enjoy the benefits of testing the proposition, none has an incentive to incur the costs related to asserting the claimed rights.
In all cases that affect the collective rights of association
members, whether those members have grievances against the
initial developer, against other association members, or against
external activity that threatens the autonomy of the group,' the
association, as the members' representative, is capable of over-

' See, for example, Mains FarmHomeowners Ass'n v Worthington, 121 Wash 2d 810,
854 P2d 1072, 1078-79 (1993) (holding a state zoning law is not applicable to association
members); Murphy v Timber Trace Ass'n, 779 SW2d 603, 607 (Mo App 1989) (holding an
association may ban "for sale" signs even though cities cannot); Vienna Bend Subdivision
Homeowners Ass'n v Manning, 459 S2d 1345, 1350 (La App 1984) (concluding that zoning
ordinances and restrictive covenants are governed by the same principles).
' See Shevock v OrchardHomeowners Ass'n, Inc., 621 A2d 346 (Del 1993) (action to
enjoin change in zoning ordinance); Gulfport v Wilson, 603 S2d 295 (Miss 1992) (action to
enjoin amendment to restrictive covenant); Washington Shores Homeowners' Ass'n v
Orlando, 602 S2d 1300 (Fla 1992) (action to oppose local bond issue).
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coming the obstacles to collective action." In fact, at least one
court has found that a homeowners association could be liable to
its members for failure to enforce its covenants. 6 The presence
of the association reduces enforcement costs by creating a repeat
player who is charged with monitoring compliance and designating the association as the party who must seek redress. The
association's interests may even coincide with those of its nonmember neighbors, each of whom similarly suffers from inducements to free riding, but none of whom has a surrogate similar to
the association. In such a case-for example, where an association seeks to enforce a zoning ordinance that applies both within
and without the association's boundaries-the association's activity may produce spillover benefits for nonmembers. s7
The enforcement role of the association also highlights a
function that I have sketched above. I indicated in that discussion that covenants can embody proxies for activities and uses
that association members wish to avoid. One way to think about
such covenants is in terms of private lawmaking among individuals who wish to define nuisance more precisely or durably than
definitions proffered by public bodies, for example, legislatures or
courts. Covenants thus allow private zoning by those who, for
instance, consider living next to a ostentatious house or a multistory dwelling to be an undesirable externality. Individuals who
wish to opt out of public lawmaking because they find it too imprecise or-with respect to nuisances-underinclusive, may also
desire to opt out of public enforcement mechanisms for fear that

' See Erreca's v Superior Court, 19 Cal App 4th 1475, 24 Cal Rptr 2d 156 (1993)
(suit against contractor); Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass'n v Caruana,623 S2d 490 (Fla
1993) (enforcement of setback provision); PleasantRidge Townhouses Homeowners' Ass'n v
T & D Construction Corp., 181 AD2d 871, 581 NYS2d 857 (1992) (action against town for
defective construction); Oak Trail Road Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v Royal Mile Corp., 246
NJ Super 590, 588 A2d 430 (1991) (action against warranty insurer). See also James L.
Winokur, Reforming Servitude Regimes: Toward Associational Federalismand Community, 1990 Wis L Rev 537, 537-40.
Professor Ellickson has indicated that the same result may be obtained by municipal
enforcement of restrictive covenants. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U Chi L Rev 681, 717
(1973). The problem with that solution is that municipalities may suffer substantial
budget constraints on their ability to bring claims, and mundane complaints about violations of restrictive covenants could fall well behind other demands for municipal expenditures.
" See Cohen v Kite Hill Community Ass'n, 142 Cal App 3d 652, 191 Cal Rptr 209,
215-16 (1983). See also Duffey v Superior Court, 3 Cal App 4th 425, 4 Cal Rptr 2d 334,
338 (1992).
' See, for example, Wilson, 603 S2d 295; Shevock, 621 A2d 346; Strohm v Board of
Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City, 869 SW2d 302 (Mo App 1994).
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those arbiters (courts) would bring to any dispute the perceptions
created in litigation borne of the very public law principles that
the residents are attempting to elude.
The association, as the initial interpreter of covenants, thus
becomes the private arbiter of whether the events that give rise
to the dispute before it in fact constitute a nuisance as that term
is defined by those who have opted out of the more generally
applicable legal standard. This does not necessarily require
courts that review decisions by associations to defer to them
(although I will shortly argue that they should). But it does suggest that one role of covenants, and of associations, is to permit
those who find insufficient protection in the legal system to augment public law with private arrangements that are more responsive to their needs.
2. The civic community model.
To this point, I have suggested that associations may facilitate the formation of homogeneous communities by encouraging
those with similar tastes to gravitate to a hospitable area in
which they can pursue their vision of the good life. I have also
suggested that associations may improve the allocation of goods
within the broader society by allowing those who desire a particular package of local public goods to obtain them without either
subsidizing or being subsidized by others with different tastes.
Defenses of community, however, often rely on loftier virtues
than mere preferences for homogeneity of tastes or lifestyles. For
many, these preferences are related to participatory values that
render associations susceptible to treatment as little democracies
and potential fountainheads of civic virtue.' By providing a forum for deliberation among interested parties and a means for
resolution of public matters, residential associations, at least in
theory, satisfy something akin to the Jeffersonian hope that participation by the electorate would be enhanced by turning the
"counties into wards." 9

' See, for example, Dilger, NeighborhoodPolitics at 131-33 (cited in note 1); Diana
Jean Schemo, Escape from Suburbia: Community Associations Thrive Amid Debate on
Freedom, Privacy and Democracy, NY Times B (May 3, 1994). For a statement of this
objective, and some skepticism that it will be realized, see Gregory-S. Alexander, The
Conditions of "Voice": Passivity, Disappointment,and Democracy in Homeowner Associations (Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies, forthcoming 1994).
' See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in HtA.
Washington, ed, 7 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 355, 357 (J.C. Riker, 1855).
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Attractive as this model may be, its practical applications are
dubious. If disputes involving homeowners associations centered
on issues that indicated robust debate or civic virtue, we might
infer that associations foster these values. For the most part,
however, these disputes, at least as reflected in the reported
cases, center on more mundane issues: satellite dishes, trailer
homes, or architectural styles.9" Many, concerning efforts to collect assessments for financing collective goods after residents
refused to make payments, reflect the failure of civic virtue. 9' It
is, of course, arguable that even these disputes may create a
sense of community in that they involve residents in public processes, and that these initial measures may beget subsequent
involvement in weightier issues. Nevertheless, I think that such
byproducts are too far removed from the concept of civic virtue
that liberal community purports to engender to admit these disputes as evidence of participatory movements within associations.
If we believed that litigation about such issues as fences
followed from an internal debate about the kind of community
that the residents were trying to create, then such litigation
might well reflect the development of civic virtue. Yet no evidence
of such interactions exists; in fact, there is some evidence that
few residents participate in internal association politics. 92 Attendance at association meetings is low (though not clearly lower
than attendance at other collective decision-making bodies), and
interactions among the association and neighbors may be adversarial rather than cooperative.93 Thus, those who enter associations are less likely to be seeking to enhance their capacity for
participatory self-governance, or their identity as active members, than to be seeking the solitude and protection that (given
my claims about homogeneity) the associational lifestyle affords.
Nor should one expect otherwise given the governance structure of associations. Civic virtue is typically advanced by enfranchising those affected by the decision-making process. Association
governance does not necessarily proceed in this fashion. Association voting schemes are typically based on property ownership
rather than on the principle of one person, one vote.94 For in90 See text accompanying notes 32-42.
See cases cited in note 71.
See Dilger, Neighborhood Politics at 139-40 (cited in note 1).
See Winokur, 1989 Wis L Rev at 62-66 (cited in note 46).
See Dilger, Neighborhood Politics at 141-44 (cited in note 1); Ellickson, 130 U Pa L
Rev at 1543-63 (cited in note 30) (endorsing deviation from voting rules that apply to
governments). For a rebuttal, see Frug, 130 U Pa L Rev at 1592-96 (cited in note 30).
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stance, renters are disenfranchised (although voting owners who
wish to continue renting should be effective surrogates for their
tenants' interests), and even those who have a vote may find
themselves easily outvoted by those with more significant
shares."
Furthermore, to the extent that civic virtue, at least as embraced in some forms of communitarianism, affects shared understandings among different, but mutually respectful communities,95 it is noteworthy that much of the criticism of associations
has been directed at their isolation from those outside the association. The exclusionary tendencies of associations does not necessarily mean that their values should be ignored or subordinated
by courts. It does suggest, however, that it is difficult to defend
associations as "minidemocracies" that are likely to inculcate
political values that will spill over as robust citizenry in the larger society.
Even if we reject this application of the civic communitarian
model, however, pieces of that model may explain much of the
appeal of at least some associations. For instance, consider that
legal doctrines that facilitate condominium conversions, urban
gentrification, or economic development have been claimed to
disturb longstanding neighborhoods in which established groups
form homogeneous communities. 7 These claims rest on an assumption that neighborhood stability is a positive good that fosters useful relationships among individuals. The Supreme Court
has invoked similar claims about the desirability of neighborhood
stability to uphold property tax schemes that discriminate in
favor of longstanding residents. 8 The stability of neighborhoods
is vulnerable both to political processes, because zoning or
changes in political boundaries may alter the scope of local activities, and to market processes, because demand for particular land

See, for example, Dilger, Neighborhood Politics at 142-43 (cited in note 1).
See Christopher J. Berry, Shared Understandingand the Democratic Way of Life,
in John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds, 35 NOMOS: Democratic Community 67, 77-78
(NYU, 1993).
See, for example, Poletown Neighborhood Council v Detroit, 304 NW2d 455 (Mich
1981); Note, Displacement in Gentrifying Neighborhoods: Regulating Condominium
Conversion Through MunicipalLand Use Controls, 63 BU L Rev 955 (1983).
' In Nordlinger v Hahn, 112 S Ct 2326 (1992), the Court upheld a California property tax scheme that was based on the acquisition value of property rather than the fair
market value of the property at the time the tax was levied. The Court concluded that the
state's desire to preserve neighborhood stability and the reliance interest of purchasers
against significant increases in taxes were sufficient to overcome Equal Protection Clause
objections. Id at 2333.
"
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uses may dictate the character of a neighborhood. Covenants,
which have a permanence less susceptible to the vicissitudes of
politics or markets, permit those who are particularly averse to
neighborhood instability to contract with neighbors for an additional level of assurance. Thus, those drawn to associations may
be those least confident that they will succeed in political disputes that affect the character of their neighborhood, a factor
that, I will argue, may influence the extent to which we are willing to permit associations to impose on outsiders.
3. Summary.
To this point, I have tried to suggest the variety of explanations for associations and the covenants by which those institutions bind themselves. This discussion shows that associations do
not perform a monolithic function, but offer different residents
different advantages, ranging from service provision more consistent with resident preferences, to private lawmaking that embodies a lifestyle defined by residents, to community stability. Each
of these objectives permits those who speak for the association to
restrict the activities of members or the activities of outsiders
that affect members. Thus, enforcement of association covenants
creates the potential for conflict, and some of those conflicts are
likely to require final resolution outside of the decision-making
structures created by the association. When this happens, courts
must address the issue of how much deference to grant to actions
taken by the association. I next address the extent to which the
functions and structure of association decision making affect this
issue.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COVENANTS

A. Some False Starts-Voluntariness and the Analogy to Local
Governments
The previous Section indicates that associations can satisfy
certain socially useful objectives in a manner superior to that of
traditional local governments. In achieving these goals, however,
associations may be more successful at performing the allocative
functions of government than the redistributive or educative
ones. In addition, the exclusionary policies of associations will
inevitably cause frictions both within the association and between the association and the larger society. We cannot readily
conclude, therefore, that associations provide an untarnished
opportunity to realize the blessings of decentralization.
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The extent to which associations provide benefits could, in
theory, be advanced by allowing external review of their regulations. There is no a fortiori reason to suggest that associations
should be able to escape a level of scrutiny that applies to local
governments providing similar services. Nevertheless, associations are not governments, and the analysis above suggests that
some of their benefits emerge from the very fact that they are not
governments. Hence, it remains unclear whether associations
should share the level of deference that is granted to local governments when associations purport to interpret and enforce the
regulations that I have suggested define their character.
A common argument in favor of granting autonomy to associations is that relationships among members are voluntary, or at
least more so than relationships among neighbors in municipalities.9 9 On this theory, the covenants of an association constitute
a volitional contract, the terms of which are entitled to all the
consideration that courts traditionally afford to contracting parties. Ambiguity in the meaning of covenants, on this view, should
be resolved only by reference to the intent of the parties0 0 rather than to the reasonableness of their agreement. Decisions in
which courts find explicit prohibitions on above-ground swimming
pools' or satellite dishes0 2 to be unreasonable independent
of what the parties intended by inclusion of those prohibitions
would, on this view, constitute unwarranted judicial interference
with contract.
While the decision to live in an association can certainly be
understood as a "voluntary" one, buyers' initial ignorance of the
attendant covenants and their legal effects may give pause to any
effort to rest too much on the parties' subjective volition.'
James Winokur contends that "[miost prospective owners do not

See Cottrell v Miskove, 605 S2d 572, 573 (Fla App 1992) (concluding that a restriction on the parking of commercial vehicles carried a strong presumption of validity
because the resident voluntarily consented to the restriction when buying property);
Jackson v Williams, 714 P2d 1017, 1025 (Okla 1985) (Wilson concurring and dissenting);
Ellickson, 130 U Pa L Rev at 1519-20, 1523-24 (cited in note 30); Reichman, 43 U Chi L
Rev at 279 (cited in note 49).
" See, for example, Krein v Smith, 60 Wash App 809, 807 P2d 906, 907 (1991);
Woodvale Condominium Trust v Scheff, 27 Mass App 530, 540 NE2d 206, 209 (1989).
101 See, for example, Westfield Homes, Inc. v Herrick, 229 111 App 3d 445, 593 NE2d 97,
102 (1992).
" See, for example, PortolaHills Community Ass'n v James, 4 Cal App 4th 289, 5 Cal
Rptr 2d 580, 583 (1992).
1"
For discussions of condominium owners' or homeowners' awareness of the covenants by which they are bound, see Natelson, 51 Ohio St L J at 61-65 (cited in note 31);
Winokur, 1989 Wis L Rev at 56-62 (cited in note 46).
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intelligently review the restrictions to which they subject themselves upon acceptance of a deed to land burdened by
servitudes."'' 4 But ignorance does not translate into allowing
purchasers to escape the effects of covenants. Especially in a legal regime that requires disclosure of covenants before the buyer
enters a binding purchase contract, °5 when the buyer could
reasonably have investigated their terms, alone or with legal
advice, it does not follow that we should reward those who fail to
make more inquiries. In ordinary contract law, the absence of
perfect information does not, of itself, render a decision "involuntary," if we mean by that conclusory term that courts need not
enforce the agreement.
I do not assert the converse claim that all covenants are
voluntary. Rather, my claim is that, even where homeowners
lack knowledge or understanding of their covenants, little is to be
gained by reducing the debate about association autonomy to one
about "choice and choicelessness" for residents.0 6 Similarly,
analysis of the scope of association autonomy is not much advanced by recognizing that even those who are aware of covenants may prefer only some of them, but are locked into a "coercive," all-or-nothing regime.0 7 As Glen Robinson has suggested, the dichotomy between fully free choice and coercion obscures
the complicated question of when market failures become so
severe that the buyers of bundled goods are acting under du08
ress.
Instead of seeking a single factor to separate coerced choices
(subject to judicial rescission) from voluntary, binding choices, it
may be more fruitful to consider whether purchasers can limit
the enforcement of covenant restraints or obtain concessions in
exchange for accepting them. Our reaction to constraints on
choice may be very different if homeowners are exposed to arbitrary sanctions that they can neither control nor escape than if
those same homeowners could reduce their exposure by exercising control over the conditions that might lead them to regret
their decision.

-i Winokur, 1989 Wis L Rev at 59 (cited in note 46).
10 At least some states require sellers of homes in an association to make copies of
covenants available to prospective purchasers. See note 52.
" See Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73
Cornell L Rev 883, 888 (1988).
"
See id; Winokur, 1989 Wis L Rev at 57 (cited in note 46).
108 Robinson, 91 Colum L Rev at 577-78 (cited in note 44).
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Consider residents of municipalities, who similarly must
purchase bundled municipal services; they cannot, for example,
decrease their property taxes by choosing private schools or contracting for private garbage collection. They presumably are able
to use the political marketplace, augmented by judicial review of
political decisions, to compensate for the "involuntary" choices to
which they are subject. If associations that serve the same functions as municipalities provide similar opportunities for resident
participation in decisions about what goods to provide and what
characteristics to enforce, then one would imagine that we could
afford private covenants the same deference that we grant to
local officials without invoking the quandary of voluntariness.
Thus, it may be worthwhile to explore the degree of latitude that
courts grant to municipal decision makers.
Before turning to that question, however, one point about
voluntariness is relevant to the discussion that follows. One
might claim that if I am correct in my assumption that covenants
serve as signals or proxies for the lifestyle of an association, then
disclosure requirements that purport to increase information to
potential residents should be superfluous since purchasers would
already be fully informed about covenants. If I am correct, one
might contend, covenants should be foremost in the minds of
potential purchasers (which is unlikely the case) because covenants serve as the focal point of the purchase decision. Moreover,
sellers should make the covenants conspicuous as selling points,
and developers should market their properties on the basis of
their covenants. Yet there is no evidence that any of these
practices exists in the market for residents.
The signal of a covenant, however, can be sent implicitly
rather than explicitly. The very homogeneity of the association
may indicate the nature of the underlying covenants to observers,
such as prospective purchasers. Thus, the absence of requests or
advertisements based on those covenants does not necessarily
imply their irrelevance to potential association members. Different covenants may be salient to different purchasers, and disclosure requirements ensure that prospective purchasers can
learn of restrictions that would be important to them. But the
fact that sellers initially tell a more sanitized story may simply
reflect a desire to widen the market for their product." 9

" My colleague Saul Levmore has suggested that law schools follow a similar pattern
in creating catalogues that illustrate a rather picturesque learning environment, even
though the underlying ethos of the law school is hard work.
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B. Association Politics
1. The relational setting.
I suggested above that judicial deference to associations
might follow the scope of judicial review of municipal regulation.
Unfortunately, any effort to discover that scope must confront the
doctrinal fact that no single standard of judicial review governs
all local regulations. In the absence of some constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary, the traditional rule of local
government powers, Dillon's Rule, provides that local governments possess only those powers that have been explicitly delegated to them, or that are necessarily implied from express legislative grants."' Doubts about the exercise of a power are to
be resolved against the locality."' Courts, therefore, play a substantial role in defining the scope of municipal autonomy and
construing the meaning of state enabling statutes without necessarily acceding to the interpretations of municipal officials. Any
analogy from ordinances to covenants based on Dillon's Rule
similarly suggests that associations should have limited autonomy from judges.
The practical force of Dillon's Rule, however, has been reduced by state constitutional home rule provisions that explicitly
abrogate narrow construction of local government powers and
that permit local governments to initiate legislation without prior
authority from the state."2 To make matters still more complex, some grants of home rule apply only to the most populous
municipalities; few associations would satisfy the threshold figure."' Thus, even if we wish to grant equal autonomy to associations and local governments, there seems as much reason to
apply the background rule of strict construction to association

110 John F. Dillon, 1 Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 237 at
448-49 (Little, Brown, 5th ed 1911). See, for example, Chemical Bank v Washington Public
Power Supply System, 99 Wash 2d 772, 666 P2d 329, 334 (1983).
,,.See, for example, City Council ofAlexandria v Potomac Greens Associates Partnership, 429 SE2d 225, 228 (Va 1993).
112 See, for example, Cal Const, Art XI, § 5; NM Const, Art X, § 6; Williams v Town of
Hilton Head Island, 429 SE2d 802, 805 (SC 1993); Des Moines v Master Builders of Iowa,
498 NW2d 702, 703-04 (Iowa 1993).
.1.See, for example, Colo Const, Art XX, § 6 (home rule for cities and towns with
population in excess of 2,000). In any case, home rule provisions "can be nullified through
actual usage." See Comment, Give 'Em Enough Rope: States, Subdivisions and the Market
ParticipantException to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 U Chi L Rev 615, 637 & n 128
(1993).
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covenants as there
is to assume that associations possess signifi4
cant latitude.1
The better way to resolve the issue of the judicial role is to
ask why we might want substantial review of local decisions, and
whether those same concerns affect decision making by associations. I have previously argued that Dillon's Rule is best understood as a mechanism for controlling interest group domination
of parochial activity." 5 The Rule allows courts to monitor decisions that appear to have been made at the behest of an influential local minority, or without representation of a disadvantaged
minority. Hence, the Rule addresses the Madisonian concern for
dominant factions, which are more likely to triumph at a decentralized level since centralized decision making provides greater
opportunities for competing factions to organize and engage in a
deliberative debate." 6 The negative implication of this proposition is that where all those affected by local decision making are
represented, discrete interest groups presumably will be unable
to exploit the unrepresented or to capture the decision-making
process. Under these conditions, the need for judicial intervention
to safeguard the unrepresented (or underrepresented) is reduced.
Political processes in municipal decision making, therefore,
are not important solely for their own sake (although I do not
want to trivialize the value of participatory processes" 7 ), but
rather because they help to accommodate the diverse and competing interests that exist in a municipality. Under these conditions, politics are necessary to decide the service package that
will be available for any locality. Those with different tastes will
be expected to become involved in the political process, to make
their preferences known, and to compromise in order to ensure
that residents with different preferences obtain a fair share of
the municipal budget and that none are systematically disadvan-

.. Some states require that the regulatory actions of associations be "reasonable," see
text accompanying note 56, a term that requires judicial construction in each particular
setting. One might infer that such requirements authorize substantial judicial intervention in regulation by associations. Nevertheless, courts may undertake review for reasonableness with a presumption of validity or not, and the choice that the court makes along
these lines will substantially affect the outcome of the cases it reviews.
11 Clayton P. Gillette, In PartialPraiseof Dillon'sRule, or, Can Public Choice Theory
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 Chi Kent L Rev 959, 983-85 (1991).
"r Federalist 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77, 83
(Mentor, 1961).
117 For an examination of arguments for and against participatory processes in government, see Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites,Participation,and Collective Action in Local
Government Law, 86 Mich L Rev 930 (1988).
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taged by municipal regulation. At the same time, because representatives of some interests will better be able to organize or to
influence decision makers in ways that do not reflect the merits
of their case, we do not want to depend entirely on political processes to allocate scarce resources among competitors. Hence,
some external intervention, typically in the form of judicial interpretation of municipal authority, will be necessary to approximate optimal local expenditures.
Judicial intervention, however, is not always beneficial.
Courts are not necessarily adept at distinguishing process failures from situations in which the minority was simply outvoted
by a sympathetic but unpersuaded majority. Thus, courts may
decide cases based more on a personal view of the proper substantive result than on the actual failure of a process." 8 Similarly, courts cannoi readily assess the regulatory needs of localities when deciding whether particular regulations were authorized, so that failure to consider the peculiar features of localities
will lead to invalidation of desirable local activity. Thus, more
judicial intervention is not necessarily better, even where the
potential advantages of a privileged interest group threaten to
skew local decision making.
But if judicial intervention is necessary primarily to referee
the process by which diverse groups compete for the resources
and regulatory apparatus of the locality, then the need for it
dissipates as the locality becomes more homogeneous and the
threat of one group dominating others diminishes. With this
possibility in mind, consider again the characteristics of associations. As with residents of localities generally, residents of associations will not have achieved the conditions required by the perfect Tiebout model."' They will not have perfect mobility, or
...See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 Yale L J 31, 60-61 (1991).
Judicial review of municipal expenditures is especially problematic. Budget decisions
are polycentric, so that funding levels for one activity may depend on funding levels for
other activities. The amounts allocated to police services may vary with the amounts allocated to schools, since, for instance, more after-school activities funded through the
school budget can reduce the need for police services during that time. While political
legislatures can attend to all parts of the budget and trade off expenditures in a manner
that reflects all interests, courts can only consider the distinct claims before them and
hence may fail to consider the basis or consequence of budget allocations on projects that
are not represented in the immediate litigation. See, for example, Riss v City of New York,
22 NY2d 579, 240 NE2d 860 (1968); Chandler v District of Columbia, 404 A2d 964, 966
(DC App 1979).
" See Tiebout, 64 J Pol Econ at 419 (cited in note 8). Under the Tiebout model, each
individual is able to migrate to a jurisdiction that offers local public goods that perfectly
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perfect information, or an unlimited number of associations from
which to choose when they make decisions about residence.
Hence, when conflict arises among association members as a
result of ambiguities in covenants, changes in peoples' preferences about the desirability of particular covenants, or the occasional refusal of individual members to abide by the norms implicit in those covenants, we cannot rely on the Tiebout solution
of mobility to reduce friction. Judicial intervention may be feasible in such cases, just as in disputes about municipal regulatory
authority.
As in those cases, however, judicial intervention is not an
unqualified benefit. Courts that err when construing ambiguities,
or that restrict associations from enforcing covenants, impose on
associations the very activities that a majority of the association
had agreed to avoid. Indeed, the desire to avoid the externalities
from such activity may have been the primary motivating factor
for joining the association to begin with. Judicial misconstruction
thus distorts the signals sent by covenants about the nature of
the association. Judicial scrutiny of the meaning or reasonableness of covenants, therefore, is desirable only if the risk of
judicial error is outweighed by the possibility that the association
will enforce covenants in a manner inconsistent with the common
vision of association members.
The costs of judicial intervention may be worth incurring, for
instance, if we believe that residents would otherwise be vulnerable to strategic behavior by the association or by a nonrepresentative subgroup of residents that had captured association decision making. These defects in the political process, I have suggested above, are just the factors that validate judicial scrutiny of
municipal decision making. On the other hand, we would take
more comfort in relying on associations to construe and administer covenants free from judicial intervention if we were confident
that association decisions systematically represented the consensus of members' views rather than a failed political process
within the association.
I think that there are reasons to believe that these latter
conditions will hold, so that association autonomy should be
favored over strict construction and scrutiny of covenants. The
basis for my conclusion lies in the very homogeneity of associations that frequently serves as a basis for their being criticized.

correspond to his or her preferences. Hence, political battles are unnecessary to resolve
competing claims to goods and services.
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Homogeneity implies that, within the association, the sources of
friction within municipalities-selection of goods or services that
are to be provided, the definition of permissible activities, and
the avoidance of externalities-have already been resolved. The
existence of homogeneity suggests that minority interests are less
likely to arise, since residents presumably share a common vision
embodied in the covenants. While factions do arise in small
groups, such as families or religious sects, the voluntary nature
of associations suggests that individuals have selected for the
characteristics of the neighborhood, and the substantial investment that they make in home purchases implies comfort with the
character of the area.12 This common vision does not mean a
frictionless subsociety, and the difficulty of exit suggests that
association members are likely to be vulnerable to strategic behavior in the interpretation of covenants. Nevertheless, the homogeneity of associations suggests that internal friction is less
likely to be caused by unsympathetic interests dominating the
decision-making process. Hence, the need for external constraints
in the form of judicial intervention is reduced.
The conditions necessary to this conclusion should be familiar to students of relational contract. Principles of relational
contract suggest that self-policing may be superior to judicial
policing against chiseling on the relationship in settings characterized by continuous interactions among parties who are
bound to each other either voluntarily (for example, through
contract) or by circumstance (for example, by virtue of being
neighbors), who cannot exit the relationship easily (primarily
because of investment in transaction-specific assets'2 1 ), and who
depend on reputation for benefits from others (a function of being
members of the same decentralized community).'22 This proposition holds in contractual settings, because the terms of the
agreement that generate disputes are likely to revolve around
vague principles not readily susceptible to judicial measurement.
Hence, even though we might be able to articulate a general

" Religion and family are less volitional in that exit from one's original religion or
family is difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, factions within some groups, such as
religions, are likely to arise as a result of the need of a subset of the group to adapt to
new circumstances. The geographical compactness of associations suggests that such
adaptations are likely to be unnecessary.
121 See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J L & Econ 233, 239 (1979).
" Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts, 67 Va L
Rev 1089, 1149-50 (1981).
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standard, such as "best efforts," to which relational parties
should aspire,' judicial attempts to determine when that standard has been satisfied are vulnerable to significant error. Those
who participate in the practice defined by such standards, however, are likely to be capable both of defining them and of detecting
defections from the cooperative norm.
Relationalism explains how neighbors may evolve a set of
mutually beneficial norms that govern their unique circumstances, even when those norms contravene positive law that applies to the broader society.'24 Norms have the feature of being
sustained by the approval or disapproval of those who share
them. 2 5 Becoming a party to a relationship governed by norms
indicates that membership is important to the actor and that the
actor wants to associate with others who define themselves as
governed by similar norms. Therefore, where there exists a
shared understanding of the ways in which parties in the relationship are to conduct themselves, failure to comply can damage
one's reputation within the group. The high exit costs associated
with relational settings indicate that those who violate the norms
will have difficulty avoiding punishment, since the only escape
lies in departure from the relationship. Since each party to the
relationship stands in a position both to impose reputational
harms on others and to suffer reputational harms at the hands of
others, reciprocal compliance with the norms is likely to evolve
and endure. 2 ' Thus, norms that evolve within a relational setting may become self-enforcing within the group. From these
characteristics of relationalism there flows a legal conclusion: The
combination of vague terms that can only roughly specify the
nature of the relationship combined with extralegal enforcement
mechanisms by those who can fill in the details of the relationship may create a situation in which legal (judicial) enforcement

'

Id at 1111-19.

The classic article for this proposition is Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 Am Soc Rev 55 (1963). A more recent and
wide-ranging application is found in Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 141-44 (Harvard, 1991).
" See Jon Elster, The Cement of Society 99-100, 105 (Cambridge, 1989). See also
Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal L Rev 2005,
2040-42 (1987). Note that I am simply attempting to describe the effects and consequences
of norms. I am not making any claim that the norms that evolve will maximize the
welfare of those who share them. For a stronger claim, see Ellickson, Order without Law
at 167-83.
" See Ullmann-Margalit, Emergence ofNorms at 21-22 (cited in note 77).
124
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is inferior to reliance on the parties themselves to keep the common understanding together.
The purchase of a residence within an association bears the
characteristics of a classic relational contract. The transaction
constitutes an investment in specialized resources, as the residence will likely be inappropriate for other uses, and even transformation of the property into a rental property may be difficult.
Exit from the transaction (selling and moving to a different
home) is difficult given the costs (fiscal and emotional) of uprooting. This difficulty of exit suggests that the purchaser expects to
remain in the property for a substantial period of time. Since
other purchasers within the association face similar constraints,
each resident expects repetitive interactions with neighbors.
"Misbehavior" by violation of the association's norms, therefore, is
open to substantial opportunities for punishment through informal mechanisms of gossip, shunning, or infliction of other
reputational injury.'27
Thus, the transaction by which a homeowner becomes subject to covenants is a contractual one, regardless of whether one
wishes to append the additional description of "Voluntary." But it
is a contract of a particular type, and a type that has been misunderstood by those who criticize the contractual approach to the
question of covenants. For instance, Gregory Alexander contends
that economic perspectives on associations are insufficient because they rely on formal contractual structures rather than
social relations. Alexander writes that a contractarian model of
relations among homeowners:
leads it to ignore the character of social relations within
residential groups. As a result, it fails to distinguish between residential groups that are held together only by mutual collaboration and convenience, and those in which individuals choose to live together because of more deeply
shared values.'28
Alexander's vision presents an overly constrained image of
what is entailed in the contract among homeowners. Far from
the discrete, rule-bound transaction that Alexander assumes is
implicit in economic explanations of contract,'29 the quintessentially relational structure of the transaction necessarily means

12
12
129

See Ellickson, Order without Law at 56-60 (cited in note 124).
Alexander, 75 Cornell L Rev at 40 (citation omitted) (cited in note 13).
Id.
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that attention must be paid to the "social relations" within the
group in order to determine, from an "economic" or
"contractarian" perspective, the proper interaction between association practices and legal intervention. These social relations
compensate for covenants' inability to detail the relationship
completely at the outset, and constrain the subsequent efforts of
any party to maximize self-interest in the interpretation of the
contract.
Indeed, Alexander implies that the very processes that create
incentives for cooperation among association members are invidious. The fact that exit costs are nontrivial for each party
transforms the relationship into something like a multilateral
monopoly (or bilateral monopoly, if we describe the relevant parties as the landowner who seeks to engage in a prohibited land
use and, as a group, all other homeowners within the association). Alexander, writing in the somewhat different context of the
capacity of covenantors to escape their promises after conditions
have changed, concludes that bilateral monopoly prevents each
party from experiencing "the liberation of an unconstrained market; both sides feel themselves in servitude to each other."3 0
Intervention from some "external source," presumably the law
or-more specifically-the judiciary, is necessary to "enable the
parties to do what they lack the power to do themselves."'3 '
Since Alexander's concern is with the inability of the parties to
exit, rather than with the context of obsolete covenants, his
criticism seems to be directed at the bilateral monopoly inherent
in the construction of association covenants as well.
Stewart Sterk, while less optimistic about the law's capacity
to resolve issues for the parties, also raises the likelihood that bilateral monopoly induces the type of strategic behavior that will
impede bargaining.3 2 Professor Sterk, however, recognizes the
point implicit in the existence of relationalism: relations that
form as a result of a bilateral monopoly from which neither party
can easily exit may generate norms that actually reduce strategic
behavior. 3 Where repeat play is inevitable because exit costs
are high, as in relations between neighbors, bilateral monopolies
may force individuals into cooperation because these same condi-

See Alexander, 73 Cornell L Rev at 899 (cited in note 106).
Id at 899-900.
" See Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors irkAmerican Land Law, 87 Colum L Rev 55, 69-88
(1987).
'33 Id at 89 & n 120.
'"

131
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tions enhance opportunities for revenge or retaliation. For each
homeowner, the investment in residence entails a relationship in
which each is solicitous of the other's needs and interprets contractual ambiguities in light of their mutual interests.134 Hence,
if one focuses on the nature of the relationship, the "contract" between the parties takes on a much richer texture than
Alexander's image permits.
Nevertheless, as I have suggested above, the informal processes of relational norms will not make cooperation perfect.'
Should association members fail to obtain satisfaction for an
alleged violation of a norm embodied in a covenant, they possess
an additional form of redress: enforcement of the covenant by the
association. It is at this point that the question of association
autonomy arises. The capacity of the association to satisfy the
functions for which it is created 36 depends substantially on the
latitude granted by courts reviewing its construction of covenants.
2. Courts and associations as interpreters of covenants.
An association's covenants may be thought to vary in one
important respect from the relational theory that I have described above. One indicium of a relational contract is the unwillingness or inability of the parties to reduce the nature of their
relationship to precise terms. The fact that the relationship will
unfold over a substantial period of uncertainty means that parties will not want to allocate contractual risks based on current
circumstances. Instead, relational parties may wish to deal with
uncertainty by defining standards for performance in "unusually
general terms."'37 These terms signal to both the parties and a
court attempting to resolve any dispute between them that the
contract involved an effort to share unanticipated and
unallocated risks that materialize as the relationship evolves.
Given the risks that might emerge with the passage of time,
general terms indicate only an intention to cooperate. Where no
alternative explicit bargain appears on the face of the contract, it
is rational to assume that the parties intended to maximize their

'" See Gidon Gottlieb, Relationalism:Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U Chi
L Rev 567, 569-73 (1983).
'" See Ellickson, Order without Law at 29-39 (cited in note 124); Scott, 75 Cal L Rev
at 2041 (cited in note 125).
'" See text accompanying notes 76-87.
137 Goetz and Scott, 67 Va L Rev at 1092 (cited in note 122).
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joint interest rather than to allocate losses resulting from unanticipated risks in some other manner.'
Similarly, where an
ambiguity appears as a result of vague terms, it makes sense to
resolve the ambiguity against the background signal of joint
maximization embodied in the contract.'39
Unlike traditional relational contracts, however, covenants
tend to be quite specific. Relationalism is inherent in a contractual clause that requires "best efforts." But "no dogs" means "no
dogs" simpliciter; relationalism, one might claim, is irrelevant to
a proper construction of the term. It would be possible to draft
covenants that speak in broad, general terms, or that specifically
reference an intent that community practices be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the mutual interests of the residents as
expressed by the homeowners association. This would be the
functional equivalent of a "renegotiation clause" that might signal a risk-sharing obligation in a commercial context. Indeed,
some covenants contain what may be considered the equivalent
of such a clause, which might inform the proper interpretation of
more specific covenants.'40 Thus, one might conclude that fail-

1" See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J Legal Stud 597, 602-04 (1990). I have previously argued that, with respect to
some historically remote risks, parties might be assumed implicitly to have engaged in an
alternative allocation of risks. See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the
Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J Legal Stud 535 (1990).
1" In some respects, however, the vagueness of the relationship suggests that courts
stand in an inferior position to comprehend and enforce the details of the relationship.
The fact that the court can recognize that joint maximization was the objective of the
parties does not mean that the court can also identify what conduct would constitute joint
maximization. Any effort to define the point of joint maximization is prone to error and
would undermine the parties' incentives to specify their contractual obligations as fully as
possible. Instead, the better position for courts may be to allow the inducements that
emerge from the parties' reciprocal capacities to punish any party perceived to be chiseling at the original understanding.
" A covenant in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for
Ashcroft, a development in Albemarle County, Virginia reads:

The Developer has deemed it desirable, for the efficient preservation of the values and amenities in the community, to create an agency to which should be delegated and assigned the powers of owning, maintaining and administering the common
properties and facilities, administering and enforcing the covenants and restrictions,
collecting and disbursing the assessments, dues and charges hereinafter created, and
promoting the recreation, health, safety, common good and general welfare of the
residents. In this regard, the Developer has incorporated under the laws of the State
of Virginia the Ashcroft Neighborhood Association as a non-profit corporation for the
purpose of exercising such functions.
(on file with U Chi L Rev). For an example of a court that referred to such a general recital in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions to define the meaning of a
restriction on "trailers," and that upheld the association's application of the restriction,
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ure to include such a provision constitutes an implicit indication
that covenants do not evince any cooperative intent. The judiciary, on this reading, suffers no disadvantage in determining
whether the conditions of compliance with precise covenants have
been satisfied.
Specificity of covenants, however, does not necessarily mean
that the parties do not recognize their relational situation or do
not rely on norms of reciprocity to enforce it. Other explanations
may suffice. First, it may be that property regimes historically
require greater specificity than commercial regimes. The relaxation of requirements of definiteness in commercial contracts,
such as the ability to have an enforceable contract with an open
price term,"' does not appear to have spilled over into the traditional insistence in real property contracts on specificity and
detail. Thus, specific clauses standing alone do not betoken a lack
of cooperative intent.
Second, specific covenants may establish the parameters of
the relationship without exhausting the details. Just as covenants provide strong signals about the lifestyle of association
members, so do they provide a basis from which to extrapolate
when the association attempts to advance that lifestyle in ways
that are not explicit in the covenants themselves. The specificity
of the covenants, however, provides limitations that frame the
relationship. Thus, specific restrictions on activities and uses play
much the same role that has been attributed to binary, winnertake-all legal rules in long-term relational contracts. Given the
incentives for cooperation in such transactions, one might imagine that binary rules that apply to discrete contracts would be
superfluous or would give way to an exhaustive litany of rules
drafted by the parties to resolve all contingencies. As Robert
Scott indicates, however, binary rules play an important role
even in situations dominated by relational norms:
The cooperative model resolves the apparent paradox of
legal enforcement. Under this conception, the many binary
contract rules serve as effective complements to the more
flexible extralegal mechanisms that regulate adjustment.
More complex, multifactored rules may thus be undesirable
to most contracting parties because they sacrifice clarity in

see Arizona Biltmore EstatesAss'n v Tezak, 868 P2d 1030 (Ariz App 1993).
14. See UCC § 2-305.
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return for only marginally reinforcing existing patterns of
cooperation."
Similarly, developers and associations are unlikely to find it
worthwhile to invest in drafting a complete contingent list of covenants that define the lifestyle preferred by residents. Instead,
representative clauses may serve as signalling devices by indicating those activities and uses of greatest concern, while implying
that potential residents to whom those clauses would be salient
will share other preferences of lesser concern. The presence of
specific clauses, therefore, neither abrogates cooperative intent
nor denies the need to work out future disputes through relational norms.
Once we recognize the force of relationalism, judicial intervention may still be useful to enforce the implicit norms of cooperation when inevitable disputes arise.13 Legal review of the
enforcement of covenants may avoid spiteful actions against an
outlier within the community'" or may clarify ambiguities
where the meaning of a covenant is substantially in doubt even
among members. "' External checks on the interpretation of relational contracts, however, make the most sense where the adjudicating body has substantial expertise in the area at issue, or is
otherwise sufficiently familiar with the use of language by the
disputants.'" Llewellyn's endorsement of merchant juries in
commercial cases, for instance, was largely motivated by his
sense that merchants alone would be sufficiently familiar with
the specialized use of language and practice in commercial contracts to render verdicts that accurately reflected the intentions
of the parties. 4 7
As a general matter, the setting in which disputes over covenants arise does not inspire confidence that courts have an ad-

142 Scott, 75 Cal L Rev at 2050 (cited in note 125).

m' See id at 2042-44.

144 See, for example, Portola Hills Community Ass'n v James, 4 Cal App 4th 289, 5 Cal

Rptr 2d 580 (1992) (imposing sanctions against a community association for pursuing an
action against a lot owner who installed a satellite dish without receiving the permission
of the association).
141 See Scott, 75 Cal L Rev at 2042 (cited in note 125).
146

Id at 2043-44.

17

See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the

MerchantRules, 100 Harv L Rev 465, 512-13 (1987). See also Scott, 75 Cal L Rev at 203738 (cited in note 125) (Parties in relational contracts governed by cooperative norms "may
have difficulty escaping the standardized arrangements [of legal rules] since any interpretive disagreements are likely to be resolved by judicial recourse to the very same context
that contractual innovators seek to escape.").

1994]

Courts, Covenants, and Communities

1421

vantage over the informal interpretive processes of associations.
The relational nature of the community provides a reason for
believing that when cooperation breaks down sufficiently to require a lawsuit, the association's interpretation of the covenant is
likely to represent the common understanding of its members.
Courts, on the other hand, are likely to miss any gap between the
association's understanding and the understanding outside the
association. While ambiguous signals may be misunderstood by
some members, where a critical mass (critical enough to persuade
the association to undertake a lawsuit) of those who respond to
these signals and who live within the community governed by
them have a common view of their meaning, that interpretation
is more likely to be accurate than the interpretation of a court
sitting outside the community. Development of and within the
community may give a covenant subtly, but importantly, different meanings than those outside the relationship would attribute
to it. Indeed, although he was writing of groups more defined by
ethnicity than geography, Robert Cover's description of the evolution of normative narratives within a private community seems
to have substantial fit with the lawmaking efforts by those within an association. 48 Thus, the occasional court that recognizes
how homeowners develop a context in which covenants are to be
understood, and that the wording of those covenants may take on
meaning different from the same words as understood outside the
community, are acting most consistently with the purposes that
underlie the development of associations. "9
From this perspective, it is important that it is the association that is enforcing the covenants. Consider, for instance, the
situation in which one resident of the association brings an ac148 The point that is relevant here is not only that private lawmaking takes place

through religious authority, contract, property, and corporate law (and of course
through all private associational activity), but also that from time to time various
groups use these universally accepted and well-understood devices to create an entire
nomos-an integrated world of obligation and reality from which the rest of the
world is perceived. At that point of radical transformation of perspective, the boundary rule-whether it be contract, free exercise of religion, property, or corporation
law-becomes more than a rule: it becomes constitutive of a world. We witness normative mitosis. A world is turned inside out; a wall begins to form, and its shape differs depending upon which side of the wall our narratives place us on.
Robert M. Cover, Foreword:Nomos and Narrative,97 Harv L Rev 4, 31 (1983).
149 See, for example, Lakes at Mercer IslandHomeowners Ass'n v Witrak, 61 Wash App
177, 810 P2d 27 (1991) (concluding that tall trees may constitute a "fence" in violation of a
covenant because that interpretation "protects the homeowners' collective interests" and
satisfies the "objective of the contract," even if it is inconsistent with the "plain meaning"
of the term).
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tion against another for violation of a covenant. 50 After entering into the association, it may be in the interest of each member
to retain maximum individual autonomy for himself or herself
while restricting the autonomy of others. In this manner, residents who seek the refuge of covenants to prevent others from
imposing externalities on them may still attempt to impose
externalities on those others; the fact that I do not want to look
at your ranch-style home in our federalist-style neighborhood
does not mean that I do not want to require you to look at the
commercial vehicle that I park in my driveway.
As noted above, the enforcement of covenants constitutes a
contractual solution to this dilemma. Given the free-rider nature
of redressing violations of community norms, however, one would
expect that enforcement actions would be brought by cocovenantors only when they have idiosyncratically high interests
in the violation. Typically this will occur between immediate
neighbors or others in close geographical proximity to the subject
of the complaint. 5 ' The fact that one party resorted to litigation, moreover, indicates that the relational and reputational constraints that normally prevent the public eruption of neighborly
disputes have failed. The very breakdown of these norms, however, makes it difficult to tell, ex ante, whether the failure occurred
because the homeowner against whom the complaint has been
filed is chiseling on the common understanding or because the
complaining neighbor is trying to maximize restrictions on others. The particular violation may impose on the neighbor costs
sufficiently great to outweigh the benefits of neighborly relations.
Alternatively, the neighbor may have idiosyncratically little taste
for neighborly relations. Indeed, if neighborly relations have
already disintegrated, institution of a lawsuit may be a matter of
spite. In short, where litigation about a covenant materializes
between two neighbors,'52 it is unclear whether the alleged violator or the complainant has misunderstood the community's
sense of the covenant or whether one of the parties is attempting
to capture some idiosyncratic gain. In neighbor/neighbor disputes,
therefore, the arguments about relationalism do not compel judi-

'
See, for example, Sargent v Smith, 863 SW2d 242 (Tex App 1993); Ingram v Wirt,
314 Ark 553, 864 SW2d 237 (1993); Crabtreev Jones, 435 SE2d 823 (NC App 1983).
" See, for example, Ingram, 864 SW2d at 238 (next-door neighbor); Crabtree, 435
SE2d at 823 (across the street).
.52See, for example, Chicago Title and Trust Co. v Weiss, 238 1ll App 3d 921, 605
NE2d 1092 (1992) (granting standing to an individual resident of a planned unit development to enforce restrictive covenants against a neighbor).
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cial deference to one party's interpretation of the covenant rather
than the other's. Hence, judicial intervention to interpret the
covenant may be appropriate or necessary, notwithstanding the
relationship.
Consider the analogous situation in which courts intervene
to determine whether a party to a contract has complied with the
kind of "best efforts" clause that characterizes some relational
contracts.'5 3 Even if there is agreement that the clause requires
each party to the dispute to maximize the joint product rather
than personal profit,5 4 each party has reason to favor a particular interpretation of what action would satisfy that vague criterion. Given the interests of the claimants, there is no inherent
reason for the court to entertain a presumption that either
party's interpretation more accurately reflects the initial understanding of the parties.
An action by the association, however, is more likely to involve a complaint against an actual defector from the relationship. A board of directors is unlikely to bring a costly and timeconsuming action in the association's name until it has heard
multiple complaints against a neighbor, made an independent
investigation, and attempted informal resolution of the matter.
Where the association decides to proceed, therefore, it is unlikely
that the complainers have been idiosyncratic. Since the association acts on behalf of all members (while the individual complainant speaks only for himself or herself), its interpretation is more
likely to reflect the common understanding of members than an
interpretation of any one party. Given the relationship among
members, it is unclear why a court, left to its own devices, should
attempt to do anything more than comprehend that same understanding.
This analysis implies that presentation of the same issue-interpretation of a covenant-in two different judicial proceedings, one initiated by the association and one initiated by an
individual member of the association, may properly carry different presumptions. The action by the association can be presumed
to reflect the current understanding of its members as to the
meaning of the contested covenant. The same action, initiated by
an individual member, carries no such cachet. Courts that treat
interpretation of all covenants the same, regardless of the identities of the disputing parties, fail to make this distinction.
15 See, for example, Bloor u FalstaffBrewing Corp., 601 F2d 609 (2d Cir 1979).
15 See Goetz and Scott, 67 Va L Rev at 1114 (cited in note 122).
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Indeed, there is a colorable argument for an additional presumption based on the identities of the parties, although I find it
unpersuasive. Given the costs (both financial and reputational)
inherent in bringing lawsuits, one would imagine that even the
idiosyncratic neighbor would prefer to have the association bring
the lawsuit alleging a covenant violation. One might therefore
infer that the individual action was brought only because the
association refused an initial request. Arguably, this refusal
indicates that the association believed that there was no violation
of the current understanding of the covenant; hence, the existence of the individual lawsuit might justify a presumption
against the plaintiff's interpretation in the individual case.
I am unwilling to endorse this conclusion only because there
might exist alternative explanations for association inaction, even
where the plaintiff's interpretation of the covenant is correct. The
association, which must act in the interests of all the members,
not just the complainant, may believe that the harm caused by
the violation does not justify the expense of a lawsuit.'55 Alternatively, the association may be willing to bring a lawsuit, but
only after a period of negotiation with the violator that the individual neighbor is unwilling to tolerate. Hence, I reject the strong
conclusion in favor of a weaker one that provides only that an
individual plaintiff is not entitled to the same presumption of a
violation that should exist when the association brings the action.
Finally, note that, when based on the cooperative relationship among association members, judicial deference to the
association's construction of its covenants is actually more consistent with the policies that disfavor restrictions on land uses than
is the traditional doctrine of strict judicial construction of covenants. The doctrine of strict construction emerges from antipathy to restraints on the alienation of land and a fear that future
productive uses of property will be prohibited by outdated limitations. Reliance on relationalism, however, serves the very goal of
retaining flexibility of land use by permitting the association to
interpret covenants dynamically to reflect the changing preferences of the community. Courts that stand outside the community will have a more difficult time discerning shifts in those

"' See, for example, Beehan v Lido Isle Community Ass'n, 70 Cal App 3d 858, 866,
137 Cal Rptr 528, 532 (1977) (holding that an association's failure to take action against
construction arguably in violation of a setback restriction was protected by the business
judgment rule).
" See text accompanying notes 46-47.
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preferences, and failure to accede to the interpretation of the
association may bind courts to a more rigid interpretation of
covenants than the association itself would endorse. Assume, for
instance, that a covenant bars "fences" higher than six feet during a period when wooden fencing is a primary mechanism for
marking boundaries on lots within the association. A homeowner
now plants a row of saplings on her boundary and allows them to
grow in excess of six feet. A court applying the traditional rule
would have difficulty enjoining the maintenance of the "fence,"
notwithstanding that the function of the covenant was to ensure
unimpeded views for all residents
at a time when traditional
157
threat.
primary
the
posed
fencing
There is, however, a dark side to this justification. Dynamic
interpretation may permit the association to enforce covenants in
a manner consistent with the understanding of a majority of
homeowners at a given time. That same dynamism, however,
may mean that residents who joined the association under one
set of signals will be frustrated by subsequent developments.
Extreme changes that would substantially frustrate expectations
might be rare for the same reasons of relationalism that make
interpretation by the association useful. Nevertheless, there may
be occasions in which developing interpretations do substantially
shift away from the original understanding of some homeowners.
These shifts impose real costs on homeowners, who at some point
may decide that the community is no longer compatible with
their preferences. That result does not mean that the community
has acted improperly. Instead it suggests that, notwithstanding
the increased stability that one receives through covenants, communities-like municipalities or other voluntary organizations-may alter identities over time and the result may adversely affect those who relied on earlier personalities. As when localities decide to provide new services or to cease providing existing services, however, that result does not necessarily translate
into opportunities for legal redress.
One additional constraint on association autonomy should be
apparent from the relational justification for judicial deference.
Some intra-association disputes do not arise in situations that
promise the repeat play that underlies my claim for association
autonomy. Assume, for instance, that a covenant prohibits the
installation of "trailers" within the association, and that a resident places on her property a structure that is prefabricated and
...See note 149.
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that is blocked on a lot without a permanent foundation.'5 8
Should a conflict arise about whether the structure constitutes a
"trailer," victory for the complainant essentially requires removal
of the structure and, most likely, of the violator as well. In this
situation, the parties face an endgame strategy in which cooperation is not compelled. Thus, there is little reason to believe that
the reputational constraints that apply when neighbors anticipate a prolonged relationship will ensure that the association is
interpreting the covenants in a manner consistent with the common understanding. Nevertheless, the fact that the association
can only assume an endgame when it is relatively certain of victory will itself be a constraint on its ability to offer idiosyncratic
constructions of the covenant.
C. Agency Costs in Residential Associations
To this point, my argument has been that judicial deference
to association interpretation of covenants is appropriate because
the very commencement or defense of a lawsuit signals courts
that a violation of the community norm has occurred. This conclusion, however, is predicated on an assumption that those who
make decisions that bind associations, typically the board of
directors, are representative of the association's members. To the
extent that this is not true, the relationship between the parties
provides little reason for the court to favor one interpretation of
the covenant over another. Hence, competing policies, such as the
traditional policy of construing servitudes narrowly, may trump
any appeal to association autonomy. It is necessary, therefore, to
examine whether there are reasons to believe that governors of
an association will tend to reflect or not to reflect the common
understanding of its members.
As in the context of business corporations 59 and local governments, the greater the divergence between the interests of
decision makers and their constituents, the stronger the argument for judicial intervention in reviewing decisions. 6 ' There
.. See Angel v Truitt, 424 SE2d 660, 661 (NC App 1993); Forest Oaks Homeowners
Ass'n v Isenhour, 401 SE2d 860 (NC App 1991). See also Gigowski v Russell, 718 SW2d 16
(Tex App 1986) (upholding the application of a restrictive covenant against mobile homes
to a double-wide manufactured home, and holding the complainants entitled to an injunction requiring the removal of the home).
'5 For treatment of agency costs in business corporation settings, see Michael C.
Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C.
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J L & Econ 301 (1983).
"o Ronald A. Cass, Privatization:Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 Marq L Rev 449, 484
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are some reasons to believe that agency costs would be less substantial for associations than in the cases of corporations or governments. For a variety of reasons, association decision makers
may internalize the consequences of their decisions in ways that
officials of localities and corporations do not. As indicated above,
the homogeneity of the association means that it is less likely
that divergent
rent-seeking groups will arise in the first
16 1
place.
Other inducements should reinforce the identity of officials'
interests with those of members. The homes of association officials will likely represent a significant percentage of their wealth,
so that their interests in maximizing property values by providing proper services and maintaining covenants that define the
nature of the association (each of which should be capitalized into
property prices) will reflect the interests of other residents. This
commonality of interest suggests that there will be fewer competing claims for the votes of decision makers and fewer opportunities for decision makers to seek rents by favoring one group of
constituents over another. When those occasions do arise, the fact
that decision makers are members of the association means that
they are subject to all the extralegal, reputational, and retaliatory consequences that lead all residents of the association, as
neighbors, to be attentive to communal rather than personal
concerns. Given the relatively small size of the group, deviations
from communal interest are likely to be more detectable and
more vulnerable to publicity. Since covenants typically affect
physical activities, their interpretation by association officials is
subject to more rigorous and frequent monitoring than the conduct of either local officials or corporate officers, which may be
more concerned with financial or other intangible information
that is difficult to obtain. The proximity of neighbors also means
that, even though association officers face only occasional elections, their constituents have more constant opportunities between elections to register complaints at low cost. Since constituents face high exit costs (at least as compared to shareholders of
firms), 1 62 they have substantial incentives to take advantage of

(1988). See also Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L Rev 811 (1992); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism,and
the Regulatory Process, 61 BU L Rev 1099 (1981); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 Stan L Rev 29 (1985).
I' See text accompanying note 120.
16 See Cass, 71 Marq L Rev at 482 (cited in note 160).
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opportunities to monitor and complain in order to protect their
investment.
Additionally, again assuming the relative clarity of the signal
sent by covenants, the existence of official misbehavior will be
more obvious. For both local and corporate officials, the criteria of
a "good" job, or of deviation from constituent interest, are rather
opaque. Local officials will face multiple, vague, and sometimes
competing objectives, such as fiscal responsibility or fair distribution of local resources, so that measuring the quality of an
official's performance is quite difficult.'6 3 Corporate officials can
be monitored by a single output measure, namely profit maximization. Nevertheless, the level of their success is somewhat beclouded by questions of trade-offs between long-term and shortterm profits, at least to the extent that we reject the achievement
of perfect markets in which expected long-term performance is
reflected in current share prices." Violations of covenants
should be relatively clear since they deal with physical arrangements. The presence of a prohibited use, a trailer home for example, is evident.
Finally, the rents that officials of associations might seek
appear less attractive than rents sought by corporate or government officials. Service as a member of an association board of
directors does not return the kinds of benefits that might lead
those who occupy management positions in other contexts to
maximize objectives other than their constituents' welfare. These
are unpaid positions, so, unlike officer or director positions in
private corporations, they are likely to have little consequence for
financial wealth. Similarly, unlike political or corporate offices,
holding such a position does not create much personal publicity
or fit within a hierarchy of decision makers, so that
nonmonetized rewards such as fame or advancing to a higher
position does not hold much attraction.
But if there are no benefits that can be obtained by participation in association governance, why would anyone engage in
the activity? While altruism may explain some level of participation, the fact that management does not generate other rewards
may suggest that only those with highly idiosyncratic objectives
1'6

Id at 483-84.

" The current critique of management attention to short-term gain suggests that
long-term performance is not, in fact, reflected in current share prices. See Robert H.
Hayes and William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, Harv Bus Rev
67 (July/Aug 1980); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for
Tortious Risk, 14 J Legal Stud 779, 784-85 (1985).
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would accept such a position. Since participating in association
governance will create public goods in which we would expect
participants to underinvest, we would anticipate that association
officials become involved in order to direct decision making, particularly expenditure decisions, toward their own unique interests. Since boards tend to be small in size, a single vote may be
important to any outcome, so that participation on a board is
likely to increase substantially the chances of advancing idiosyncratic preferences. Assume, for instance, that a neighbor believes
that a covenant should be interpreted in a particular, if unconventional, way. It may be that the best way to obtain a sympathetic vote of the association is to become a member of the board
of directors and either trade votes with other members or rely on
the small number of votes to attract the few allies necessary to
the desired outcome. Alternatively, individuals may become association officials in order to maximize personal interests unrelated
to future objectives or to public service, such as the opportunity
to be a "busybody" or to enforce rules for the sake of exercising
personal authority rather than to ensure the success of a community ethos.
At the same time, resident monitoring of board members
may be less intense than the above argument suggests. While
constituents in all organizations face incentives against monitoring, most shareholders can often avoid the implications of free
riding because other shareholders have sufficiently high stakes to
warrant their monitoring regardless of the inactivity of others.
Whether association members can similarly rely on a neighbor
with an intense interest in a covenant violation depends on how
much more significantly that neighbor is affected than others.
One would anticipate that association officials' attention to violations of covenants that restrict loud noises, for instance, would be
monitored more closely than violations of covenants that are
directed at limiting traffic, such as conducting a commercial enterprise in a home.
One additional point worth considering about agency costs
relates to the changes in the governance structure of a community during its life cycle. When a subdivision is first created, the
developer will typically retain substantial discretion over its
governance. Only after a certain number of units within the subdivision are sold will the developer cede control to the association
or its board of directors. The coincidence of the developer's and
residents' interests may be as complicated as the incentive structure I have suggested exists between the association and its res-
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idents. The developer desires to market homes within the association, and compliance with the covenants, by defining the nature
of the community, serves as a marketing tool to attract residents
whose interests are reflected in those covenants. Hence, one
would imagine that market-based incentives would induce the
developer to interpret the covenants in a manner consistent with
the norms of the community. 6 ' During the period that the developer believes that its marketing strategy will be successful,
there seems little reason for it to deviate from this common understanding.
The problem arises when the developer believes that its
initial strategy was mistaken. At this point, the developer may
desire to change the terms of the transaction. 66 Assume, for instance, that the covenants of an association declare that no property shall be used for commercial purposes. After slower-thananticipated sales, the developer, who retains the capacity to interpret the covenants, permits new purchasers to open offices
within their homes. Association members who have purchased
their homes to this point might object that the restriction on
commercial use applies to offices within residences as well as to
buildings intended solely for commercial purposes. They might
contend that the very concerns about increased traffic and difficulty of policing transients that would apply to a commercial
building also apply to a commercial use of a residential building.
Given that the developer's interest in maximizing income no
longer coincides with existing residents' interest in maintaining a
particular type of community, there seems little reason to believe
that the developer's unchecked interpretation of covenants will be
consistent with existing residents' understanding of those covenants.
" See Epstein, 73 Cornell L Rev at 917 (cited in note 67). Compare Ellickson, 40 U
Chi L Rev at 681 (cited in note 85) (claiming that covenants drafted by developers could
provide more efficient land-use regulations than zoning because developers provide relatively inexpensive alternatives to bureaucratic drafting, while market forces will induce
the developer to include only provisions that increase land values in excess of the costs
imposed by the constraint). For a response that individuals who are attracted by these
covenants are not very successful at predicting their future preferences, see Stewart E.
Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 Cornell L Rev 956, 957-61 (1988). While
Professor Sterk suggests reasons why individuals may not have perfect foresight, he does
not purport to establish the proposition that judges will be better able to detect when individuals have changed their preferences or when the law ought to intervene to correct
initial decisions made with imperfect foresight.
" Frances FitzGerald reports that Sun City, Florida, was originally intended to contain only single-resident housing units, but was changed to include condominiums when
the pace of housing sales slackened. FitzGerald, Cities on a Hill at 214 (cited in note 14).
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I cannot readily conclude, therefore, that either the association or the developer will necessarily interpret covenants in a
manner consistent with the consensus of association members.
Divergence in the views of association officials, however, does not
necessarily invite more intrusive judicial scrutiny of covenants. If
we believed that courts were adept at identifying those cases in
which decision makers had interests that deviated from those of
association members, we might direct courts to intervene more
readily in those cases. But if courts have no greater ability than
association members to discern rent-seeking activity by association officials, there seems little reason to rely on those outside
the community to define the scope of community norms as embodied in covenants.
III. ASSOCIATIONS AND NONRESIDENTS
The assertion that cooperative norms will emerge within the
association and are more readily identifiable and enforceable by
members than by courts does not entail that these norms will
serve the welfare of those outside the association.'6 7 Thus, one
negative implication of my argument to this point is that judges
should be far more interventionist where associations impose
costs on nonresidents. The problem is that this principle, without
more, swallows up the argument for judicial restraint. All covenants affect those outside the association, in that they restrict access to prospective home purchasers who prefer the same lifestyle
as association residents, except for one (or more) of the covenants. At the same time, there are few situations in which decisions of associations are specifically aimed at nonresidents. 6 '
We return, then, to the problem with which we began: determining the latitude that we are willing to confer on groups that seek

" See Ellickson, Order without Law at 169 (cited in note 124) (noting that norms
that advance the welfare of a close-knit group may disserve outsiders).
"6 Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 NJ 306, 471 A2d 355, 359 (1984),
stands as a notable exception. In that case, an association of property owners sought to
exclude nonresidents from a local beach. The court held that the public trust doctrine
required access to beachfront property and applied to both municipally owned and privately owned property. The court, however, noted the extraordinary relationship between
the association and the borough within which it had been formed. The borough had
contributed to the cost of jetties, had provided the association free office space, exempted
certain association property from taxation, and had included association activities under
borough insurance policies. Id at 365-68. See also MaJor v Miraverde Homeowners Ass'n,
7 Cal App 4th 618, 9 Cal Rptr 2d 237, 241-43 (1992) (enjoining a rule that limited access
to recreational areas of an association by nonresident owners).
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some degree of isolation, notwithstanding that their private arrangements affect nonmembers.
The polar case for judicial intervention exists where the
association seeks to engage in conduct that could not constitu169
tionally be enforced with the participation of state actors.
Here, the externality may take the rather intangible form of
affecting even those who are not directly excluded, because the
basis of exclusion makes them uncomfortable about living in a
society where such exclusions are practiced. 70 Less clear is
which outcome is preferable when the association seeks to enforce a covenant that does not offend constitutional principles,
but that is inconsistent with other social norms. In these cases,
our willingness to allow the association to set itself up against
the broader society reflects our reaction to the kind of diversity
that I suggested at the outset underlies Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Schad. 7 ' The desire for heterogeneity implicit in
those remarks finds resonance in the sociological literature that
urges the development of community by allowing greater autonomy for localities:
[T]he legal tendency is to assume that there is a unitary
national community rather than a national community composed of thousands of communities. Thus, the people of
Kokomo, Indiana, must accept public promotions of pornography, for instance, because such promotions are protected
by precedents established in Berkeley, California, or in
Times Square. It is just barely arguable that the person who
wants to see a live sex show in downtown Kokomo would be
denied a constitutional right were such shows locally prohibited. It is a great deal clearer that the people of Kokomo are
now denied the right to determine democratically the character of the community in which they live. More careful distinctions are required if we are to stay the rush toward a
situation in which civil liberties are viewed as the enemy of
communal values and law itself is pitted against the power
of people to shape their own lives.'72
16

See Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 Harv L Rev 647, 656-

58 (1981). See also Laguna PublishingCo. v Golden Rain Foundation ofLaguna Hills, 131
Cal App 3d 816, 182 Cal Rptr 813, 829 (1982).
170 So, for instance, a racial restriction may adversely affect even those who are not
members of the restricted race because they are not indifferent to living in a race-neutral

society.
171
1

See text accompanying notes 2-6.
Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Medi-
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Some courts that have rejected intrusive interpretations of covenants, notwithstanding that enforcement creates adverse effects
for nonresidents, appear at least implicitly to endorse the same
view. Other courts, however, appear to seize on the conflict between covenants and conflicting social policies either explicitly to
abrogate the private covenants or to entertain narrow constructions of them. 7 '
Analysis of these cases may provide some hints toward a
theory of when association activity generates sufficient effects on
nonresidents as to require intervention. Consider, for instance,
the issue of whether prohibitions in covenants on the operation of
businesses within the association or limitations of occupancy to
"single-family" residences can be enforced to prohibit group
homes.'74 Several courts have recognized that a restrictive definition of residence or family that requires blood or marital relationships between the occupants is inconsistent with state policies in favor of the creation of group homes, where individuals
live together and either care for each other or are cared for by a
common supervisor.'7 5 Other courts have upheld the
association's restrictive definition of residence or family to more
traditional forms.'76
The highwater mark for the latter position appears to have
been reached in Clem v Christole, Inc.'77 In that case, residenatingStructures in Public Policy 11-12 (American Enterprise Institute, 1977).
17

In Baldwin v Nature's Hideaway, PhaseI-B Homeowners Ass'n, 613 S2d 1376 (Fla

App 1993), for instance, the court found that an adult foster care home was not prohibited
by a covenant restricting businesses within the association because no nuisance was
shown. A provision of the covenants indicated that no activity that constituted a nuisance
could be carried on within the association. The court read the prohibition on businesses to
be subject to the "no nuisance" clause rather than reading the prohibition on businesses
as an independent clause. The court recognized, but did not decide the effect of, a state
statute overriding local laws and ordinances restricting residences to single-family units.
Id at 1377-78. See also Double D Manor, Inc. v Evergreen Meadows Homeowners' Ass'n,
773 P2d 1046, 1048 (Colo 1989) (interpreting a restrictive covenant on single-family
residences as only a structural, not a use, restriction); Prien Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v
Mocklin, 560 S2d 115, 117 (La App 1990) (interpreting an ambiguous distance requirement between fences and the "waterfront line" so as to impose the fewest restrictions on
the property).
1
See Brussack, 16 Ga L Rev at 34 (cited in note 43); Thomas F. Guernsey, The
Mentally Retarded and Private Restrictive Covenants, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 421 (1984).
"75See, for example, Baldwin, 613 S2d at 1377; Double D Manor, Inc., 773 P2d at
1051-52; Turner v United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n, 772 P2d 628, 630 (Colo App 1988) (group
home constitutes a family); Vienna Bend Subdivision Homeowners Ass'n v Manning, 459
S2d 1345, 1348-50 (La App 1984) (same).
17 See, for example, Mains FarmHomeowners Ass'n v Worthington, 121 Wash 2d 810,
854 P2d 1072, 1075-76 (1993).
1
582 NE2d 780 (Ind 1991). See also Minder v MartinLuther Home Foundation, 582
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tial subdivision property owners sought to prevent the creation of
a group home for developmentally disabled individuals within the
subdivision. Covenants that governed the subdivision prohibited
the use of buildings "for business or commercial purposes of any
kind" and restricted the use of lots within the subdivision to
"single-family or two family dwellings." 7 ' The fact that the
association's preferences were inconsistent with those of the
larger society were arguably evident from the fact that the state
legislature had enacted a statute (subsequently repealed) that invalidated such restrictive covenants. 9 The court declared that
the statute violated the contracts clause of the state constitution,
insofar as it applied to preexisting restrictive covenants. The
court considered such covenants to be issues of private concern,
rather than of public policy. 8 ' While disruption of private contractual expectations might be warranted to satisfy an important
social problem, and while prospective application of the prohibition might be appropriate, the problems of housing the developmentally disabled did not offset the substantial costs that would
materialize should restrictive covenants be negated:
Restrictive covenants permit property owners to collectively provide or obtain protections significantly contributing
to the peace, safety, and well-being of themselves and their
NE2d 788 (Ind 1991).
"7sClem, 582 NE2d at 782.
'

Id. The statute provided:
(a) This section applies to each restriction, reservation, condition, exception, or
covenant that is created before April 1, 1988, in any subdivision plat, deed, or other
instrument of, or pertaining to, the transfer, sale, lease, or use of property.
(b) A restriction, reservation, condition, exception, or covenant in a subdivision
plat, deed, or other instrument of, or pertaining to, the transfer, sale, lease, or use of
property that would permit the residential use of property but prohibit the use of
that property as a residential facility for developmentally disabled or mentally ill
persons:
(1) on the ground that the residential facility is a business;
(2) on the ground that the persons residing in the residential facility are not
related; or
(3)for any other reason;
is, to the extent of the prohibition, void as against the public policy of the state.

Ind Code § 16-13-21-14 (1988), repealed by Ind Pub L No 9-1991 § 98 (May 12, 1991).
" The law must not be arbitrary, unreasonable or patently beyond the necessities of
the case. The legislature may not under the guise of protecting public interests arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations.
Clem, 582 NE2d at 783, citing Dep't of FinancialInstitutions v Holt, 231 Ind 293, 108
NE2d 629, 634 (1952).
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families. These purposes are consistent with values identified in our Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 1 expressly recognizes that government is instituted for the peace,
safety, and well-being of the people. Article 1, Section 31
protects the right of citizens to assemble together in a peaceable manner to consult for their common good.'
At first glance, the decision appears to elevate private agreements above what would be required by the analysis that I have
suggested, that is, judicial deference to the relational process that
incorporates the views of all those affected by the decision. There
is certainly no reason to believe that the developmentally disabled were represented in the creation or interpretation of the
restrictive covenant at issue. Nor is it easy to find a surrogate for
them within the association, at least not in a case like Clem
where the purchaser of the home had not previously been an association member.'8 2 Perhaps sellers who wish to maximize
their sale price and who (as a result of the fact that they are
selling) no longer bear a reputational burden within the community can serve as surrogates for group home operators. But my
prior analysis suggests that sellers who act in this manner, as
well as residents who transform their homes into group residences, may simply be rejecting the ethos of the community as
reflected in the covenants; they have changed their minds about
the initial deal. Thus, Clem directly asks the question of how to
resolve our ambivalence about conflicts between the preferences
of those within and without the association.
One way to sort out when the adverse effects are sufficiently
substantial to warrant intervention is to ask whether we are
confident that the conflicting social policy actually reflects a consensus of the broader society. Principles that reach constitutional
proportions do so in large part because they reflect the deeply
held views of a substantial segment of the population. Thus,
when we reject private arrangements that conflict with constitutional principles, we may feel comfortable that we are properly
imposing a majoritarian conception of what is necessary to pursue the good life for society as a whole. Statutory embodiments of
public policy may be more suspect. For instance, I suggested
above that the presence of a statute in Clem prohibiting restrictions evinced a state-wide view in favor of integrating group

,8' Clem, 582 NE2d at 784-85.
182 Id at 781-82.
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homes into traditional neighborhoods. It is possible, however, to
tell a somewhat convincing public-choice story about the same
legislation. According to this story, activists for the mentally ill
were able to capture the state legislature, notwithstanding that
their views did not reflect those of the state as a whole. State
legislation would generate less resistance than local ordinances,
since the state-wide effect of the prohibition would be too diffuse
to make it worthwhile for local opponents to coalesce. At the
same time, associations that may have significant influence at
the local level are unlikely to have comparable access to state
legislative processes. Thus, they would be unable to counterbalance interest-group politics at the state level. If we believe this
story, then the enforcement of covenants, far from countering
majoritarian influences, serves as an anticapture device for those
who are less prone to protect themselves against interest-group
politics. In Clem, for instance, if we believe that the interestgroup story offers a more compelling explanation for the legislation, then we might consider the decision to uphold preexisting
covenants as an effective weapon to blunt the effects of interestgroup capture.18 3
This anticapture rationale makes the most sense when the
association seeks an exemption from a generally applicable requirement, as in Clem. Yet even within this subset of cases, the
anticapture justification perhaps grants too much autonomy insofar as it suggests that associations can receive an exemption from
ordinances or statutes simply by adopting contradictory covenants. Thus, exemptions might make sense only in those cases
where judges detect a reasonable likelihood that the conflicting
legislation resulted from capture. It should not be surprising,
therefore, if courts reject claims that associations are exempt
from municipality-wide zoning plans, because such an exemption
cannot easily be explained by capture.
More commonly, however, covenants involve efforts by an
association to create restrictions that are not directly addressed
one way or the other by the locality or the state. We would expect
this type of case to arise frequently if I am correct that a primary
function of associations is to allow privatized regulatory schemes
that are more tailored to residents' preferences than municipal

18

The argument here creates a parallel in the association/local relationship to

Tocqueville's contention that decentralized municipal government would provide some
shelter for liberty even in periods of centralized oppression. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 262-63 (Anchor, 1969) (J.P. Mayer, ed).
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regulation. Even if we are willing to recognize some value in this
objective, we would expect some nonconstitutional limits on its
pursuit, given the consequences for nonresidents and the fact
that even municipal corporations have only limited ability to
impose adverse effects on nonresidents." 4 While the permissible
level of these externalities is hard to define, one might infer from
judicial reaction to the group-home cases that the limitations on
association autonomy depend on whether enforcement of the
covenant at issue excludes in a manner that substantially impairs the mobility of those excluded.
Under this analysis, the question of whether to trump covenants can be viewed in traditional prisoner's dilemma terms.
These consequences may best be seen by considering the policies
of cities rather than associations. Group homes, for instance, may
be considered undesirable by most municipalities.'8 5 Hence, if
we allow a municipality to reject siting of such land uses, most
municipalities will prohibit them. Under these circumstances,
municipalities that might accept a "fair share" of such homes
would fear that they will end up accepting all of them if other
localities proscribe such uses. Thus, even municipalities otherwise willing to accept their "fair share" have incentives to join in
the ban. Universal prohibition on such bans may therefore be
necessary in order to locate group homes anywhere. This logic
does not necessarily mean that private arrangements among
multiple parties should be abrogated. If localities are required to
accept such land uses, they can fulfill that obligation by locating
the uses outside of associations. Within the locality, however, the
effects of this conclusion would lead to the same perverse results
that govern interlocal relationships. In the absence of a requirement that all parts of the locality accept group homes, any neighborhood, including those willing to accept a "fair share" of the
homes, will seek to prohibit them for fear that others will do so.
The fact that communities with covenant regimes will have an
easier time avoiding such uses than other parts of the locality

" Holt Civic Club v Tuscaloosa, 439 US 60, 69-70, 75 (1978), may be cited for the
proposition that municipalities can impose costs on nonresidents. But without express
authority, localities do not have extraterritorial regulatory power. Questions of municipal
boundaries typically require examination into whether the locality is imposing costs on
those outside the suggested boundaries. Finally, municipal decisions that affect nonresidents are typically subject to market constraints that do not apply as readily to homeowners associations. For instance, municipalities that seek to impose commuter taxes
must take into account the possibility that commuters can shop and work elsewhere.
" See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally UndesirableLand Uses, 78 Cornell L Rev 1001, 1001-02 (1993).
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may mean that associations suffer fewer undesirable land uses.
Remaining residents of the locality will presumably attempt
either to create their own contractual arrangements to bar such
uses or to seek a locality-wide ban. Judicial refusal to enforce
covenants that have such effects serves as a mechanism for
breaking out of the prisoner's dilemma that exists where numerous localities or areas of the same locality would, if left to their
own devices, reject the same individuals. Conversely, judicial enforcement of covenants that affect nonresidents may be appropriate where there remain "enough" areas to which those excluded by the covenant can migrate.'86
Focus on the extent of the exclusion may be seen as a corollary to the Lockean proviso that permits individuals to retain the
fruits of their labor as long as there remains "enough and as good
left in common for others."'8 7 Exclusion from an idiosyncratic
community permits the members of that community to realize
their interests without significantly penalizing those who are
excluded. As the number of communities who endorse the same
exclusion multiplies, however, the mobility of the excluded may
become so constrained as to trump the interests in upholding the
exclusion. This explanation may help us to understand why we
might have different reactions to the same exclusion, depending
on its source. If private individuals enter into a contract to exclude those with certain characteristics from their homes, we
might have little concern for its effects on the excluded, since the
scope of the contract is limited in space and time. While the same
contract could theoretically be entered into by an infinite number
of people, that event seems unlikely (as evidenced by the transaction-cost explanation for covenants). Once covenants cure that
collective-action problem, however, the likelihood that substantial
numbers of people will join such a covenant and will commit
future generations to the same proposition causes more concern.
Should we elevate the scope of the covenant further by allowing
state entities to cure the collective-action problem (by passing
laws embodying the exclusion, thus increasing the geographical
scope of the exclusion and giving it the force of legal sanction),
we would make the effects of the exclusion even more difficult to
avoid.

i" See, for example, Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n, 854 P2d at 1077-78.
"
John Locke, Second Treatise on Government § 27 at 19 (Hackett, 1980) (C.B.
Macpherson, ed).

1994]

Courts, Covenants, and Communities

1439

This distinction between permissible and impermissible exclusions provides a justification for allowing a community to
impose its preferences on outsiders where the basis for exclusion
does not substantially constrain the mobility of those excluded.
In reasoning to this conclusion, I have also indicated that local
political forces to exclude a particular group or land use might be
so prevalent throughout society as to justify universally invalidating the effects of those forces-both in associations and in
more traditional governmental units. Once we focus on political
action, however, there may follow a stronger justification for
allowing affirmative exclusions by associations, a justification
that follows from a claim of political equality between those who
live within and without associations.
I assumed above that those who live in neighborhoods not
governed by covenants will nevertheless be able to influence local
officials and thus will be able to procure locality-wide bans on
undesirable activities. This assumption suggests that the absence
of covenants does not necessarily place these individuals at a
political disadvantage. Rather, they may achieve their community norms by participating in political processes on an ad hoc
basis. The decision not to live within an association may therefore indicate a preference for ad hoc political activity rather than
for ex ante regulation.
For instance, one might expect that in any locality, resolution of controversial issues such as siting of group homes will
necessitate some form of bargaining between the locality and the
areas potentially available for the disfavored use. Neighborhoods
in which coalitions can form to oppose the siting or to bargain
with the locality may do better in avoiding these uses or in obtaining compensation for accepting them than neighborhoods in
which coalitions have more difficulty forming.'88 If those who
live in associations have an entitlement to enforce covenants that
prohibit uses available elsewhere in the locality, local officials
who wish to site those uses in the association will bear the burden of beginning the bargaining process, while residents of neighborhoods outside of associations will bear the burden of beginning the bargaining process with local officials. This ostensible
disparity becomes more appropriate if we believe that those who
live in associations are systematically less effective at creating
coalitions to oppose or influence municipal action.

8

See Been, 78 Cornell L Rev at 1002 & n 6 (cited in note 185).
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At first, this conclusion seems counterintuitive. Indeed, the
very existence of the association suggests that a collective body
exists, so coalition costs are lower. In addition, some instances of
association action against municipal conduct do exist, such as
where associations seek to enjoin the application of local ordinances.'8 9 The fact that an association is effective at regulating
relations among members, however, does not indicate similar
success in dealing with outsiders. Although there is some evidence that associations maintain contact with local officials, 9 '
that same evidence suggests that members are not systematically
involved in local public affairs. Because association voting
schemes do little to foster participation even in association affairs, 9' migration to an association may indicate a relative inability or unwillingness to participate in the politics of the diverse world outside association boundaries. After all, it seems
somewhat anomalous to assume that association members migrate to a common area in order to seek isolation within homogeneity and to live by highly tailored, privatized regulations, and
simultaneously to assume that they seek the robust debate of a
diverse political marketplace. Perhaps this distaste for politics
outside the association also explains the otherwise anomalous
phenomenon that associations receive little statutory protection.
One would imagine that groups of associations, composed of a
limited number of readily identifiable units with concentrated
populations that can be easily monitored, would make effective
lobbying groups for issues of common concern, such as avoiding
double taxation and obtaining reimbursement of privately provided public services.'9 2 While I am reluctant to infer too much
from the failure of associations to organize for legislatively granted benefits, the presence of such legislation would defeat the hy-

'" See cases cited in note 83. There is some evidence that association members
believe that they and their associations are more attentive to local political affairs. See
Dilger, NeighborhoodPolitics at 134-35 (cited in note 1). The basis for this supposition is
unclear.
1'0 Id at 135.
191

See id at 139-141.

" Residents face double taxation insofar as the association must pay property taxes,
funded by assessment imposed on individual lots, on common areas that the association
owns. At the same time, individual residents pay property taxes on the value of their
homes, which value also reflects the availability of the common areas. See ACIR-Report at
18 (cited in note 1). As noted above, see note 70, there is little statutory basis for reimbursement to associations for privately provided services that the locality would otherwise
be required to provide to residents. It is possible that the absence of these protections is
evidence of the relatively new popularity of associations rather than the systematic
unwillingness of residents to participate in the traditional political marketplace.
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pothesis that association members have less taste for the political
marketplace than exists outside the association.
This view is also consistent with my prior claim that associations constitute enforcers of private rules for those who have
opted out of governmental decision making. If association members are relatively poor lobbyists for their interests in their interactions with local governments, and if we want to ensure that
local governments have no more ability to impose the costs of
social programs on residents within associations as on those
without, we might assign entitlements differently to those two
groups. Granting latitude to covenants might serve as an equalizer that compensates for the relative unwillingness of association
members to bargain for a fair share of undesirable land uses that
must be spread throughout the locality.
CONCLUSION
Residential associations may be easy targets. Their attraction is frequently based on mundane aspects of the good life rather than on the creation of robust communities. They tend to exclude those worst off in the society. They impose costs on their
members who seek to avoid restrictions and on outsiders who
may have to bear a greater level of undesirable activities and
land uses that are excluded from the associations. Nevertheless, I
have suggested that they may fulfill important functions and do
so in a manner that entitles their decisions to substantial deference in a wide range of cases. Whether associations realize this
potential depends on such issues as their ability to signal a common lifestyle to potential members and the susceptibility of their
officials to interests inconsistent with those of their members. On
some of these issues, I remain agnostic. But the overall picture I
have attempted to paint is of a mechanism for sorting that is no
more invidious than we allow through the creation of more formal jurisdictions (municipal corporations) and that is more responsive than those institutions to the desires of residents. That
these smaller jurisdictions may engage in activities that set them
apart from others in society is undeniable. But that is a source
for further analysis, not a conclusion that necessarily leads to
denigration of these institutions.

